Legitimate combat losses in July 1995 and their impact on the Srebrenica narrative (2009)

It seems that the summer of 2009 has been none too kind to the “Srebrenica genocide affirmers” [to coin a phrase]. Some common sense questions about their position have been raised and it has been the topic of professional skepticism from the most unexpected quarters. Serious cracks are appearing in the Srebrenica genocide narrative.

On July 7, 2009, Der Spiegel published a sensational interview with Kristoph Flügge, who is a sitting judge in the Karadzic case. Among other comments, judge Flügge expressed some views on “Srebrenica genocide” which can only be termed highly controversial and unorthodox considering his position at ICTY. In essence, this is what he said:

SPIEGEL: The Karadzic case deals with the issue of responsibility for mass killings, which are being referred to as genocide. However, international law experts are divided over whether the Srebrenica massacre can be defined as genocide.

Flügge: I don’t want to discuss this specific case. More generally, however, I do ask myself whether we even need the term genocide to characterize such crimes. Why do we have to draw this distinction in the first place? Does it make it more or less unjust when a group of people is killed, not for national, ethnic, racist or religious reasons, as regulated in our statute, but merely because these people all happened to be in a certain location? This was often the case during Stalin’s battle against the so-called Kulaks in Ukraine.

SPIEGEL: That wouldn’t have fallen under the elements of the offense of genocide.

Flügge: Which is why I believe that we should consider devising a new definition of the crime. Perhaps the term mass murder would eliminate some of the difficulties we face in arriving at legal definitions. It would also work in Cambodia, where Cambodians killed large numbers of Cambodians. What do you call that? Suicidal genocide? Sociocide? Strictly speaking, the term genocide only fits to the Holocaust.”

Clearly, these are thoughtful comments by an experienced and responsible international jurist. One is free to agree or disagree with them, but they cannot be disregarded as merely flippant or inappropriate.

“These statements are controversial, and have provoked angry responses,” writes genocide expert, Prof. William Shabas, in his blog, “especially from Bosnia and Herzegovina. But they are hardly shocking, and constitute a useful reflection on the use of the term and its utility under international law. He is certainly not alone to express such ideas. Others, such as Prof. David Scheffer, have said as much, proposing that there should be an overarching concept known as ‘atrocity crimes’.”[1]

The “angry responses” were not long in coming from some elements in the Bosnian Muslim community, in the form of a demand for a “complete retraction” of judge Flugge’s remarks and his removal from all ICTY cases dealing with Srebrenica.[2]

The anger has apparently overflowed to also target the former Swedish foreign minister [and former Bosnia viceroy] Karl Bilt. Scornfully dismissed as a failed politician,” Bilt was taken to task by the Bosnian Muslim publication Dani [3] for a litany of sins, of which the following statement, found in his memoirs, seems to be regarded as the most egregious:

“In five days of massacres, Mladic had arranged for the methodical execution of more than three thousand men who had stayed behind and become prisoners of war. And probably more than four thousand people had lost their lives in a week of brutal ambushes and fighting in the forests, by the roadside and in the valleys between Srebrenica and the Tuzla district, as the column was trying to reach safety.’ (Carl Bildt, Peace Journey: The struggle for peace in Bosnia, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1998, p. 66).

The part to which some Bosnian Muslim commentators most strongly object seems to be Karl Bilt’s apparent belief that about four thousand inhabitants of Srebrenica had lost their lives in combat activity. [4] That estimate—if correct—would be a serious threat to the mathematical integrity of Srebrenica genocide calculations.[5]

If a substantial portion of Srebrenica-related Muslim losses in July of 1995 is indeed attributable to combat activity, the questions raised by judge Flugge begin to make even greater sense: the fewer the victims of execution, the more untenable the theory of genocide becomes.

But it so happens that Bildt (whatever his sources) is quite close to the truth. For one reason or another, a key aspect of the July 1995 Srebrenica story has been systematically obscured: Muslim losses, which were undoubtedly in the thousands, were the result of two entirely separate causes. One of the causes was execution of prisoners of war, which occurred mostly in the Zvornik area. The other cause was combat with Serb forces, which occurred to the west, along the route of withdrawal of the mixed military/civilian Muslim column. It was initially about 12,000 to 15,000 strong, it comprised armed elements of the 28th Division from Srebrenica, and it was trying to break out of Srebrenica in order to reach Muslim-controlled territory in Tuzla.

The distinction between the two categories of losses is very important to a proper understanding of what happened, because the legal implications are quite different. Losses incurred by a mixed military/civilian column in the course of combat, while certainly regrettable, are not a crime under international law. Losses incurred as a result of the execution of war prisoners do constitute a war crime, without the slightest doubt. But the precise classification of that war crime, whether it is murder, or extermination, massacre (as suggested by judge Flügge), or genocide, can be determined only with regard to a number of ancillary factors. That includes the presence of special intent (dolus specialis), if we wish to raise that particular war crime to the level of genocide.

Setting the legal debate aside,[6] we refer those of our readers who are interested in the underlying empirical facts to the “Forensic analysis of post-mortem reports” section of our website. They will find there a thorough analysis of every single post-mortem report prepared by ICTY prosecution forensic specialists. The summary conclusion arising from this analysis is that slightly less than 2,000 bodies are verifiably present in the mass graves exhumed so far from which data were used in the various Srebrenica trials. That number encompasses both categories, the executed and those who were killed in action. Of that number, about 1100 exhibit patterns of injury consistent with execution, the rest with combat deaths.

One conclusion that follows is that, a decade and a half after the fact and with unrestricted access by ICTY investigators, the available Srebrenica corpus delicti is barely 25% of the alleged total of 8,000 genocide victims. The second, equally glaring conclusion, is that about half of even that relatively small number of physically verifiable victims perished in combat and, therefore, must be kept separate from war crime victims, whether or not the latter died as a result of genocide.

The analysis that follows corroborates Karl Bildt’s estimates and it helps to present a more realitic numerical and legal breakdown of the losses suffered by the Muslim side after the takeover of Srebrenica on July 11, 1995.

ANALYSIS OF Muslim COLUMN LOSSES DUE TO MINEFIELDS AND COMBAT ACTIVITY

I. The issue

One of the fundamental issues in the controversy surrounding the Srebrenica operation in July of 1995 is the number of Muslim casualties during the critical period, which is usually defined as the week after Serbian forces took over Srebrenica on July 11, 1995. A subsidiary issue is whether these casualties were precipitated by one or more legally distinct causes. Were they caused in substantial part by combat activity, by wanton execution in contravention of the laws and customs of war, or by the intent to commit genocide? Whatever the ultimate number of those casualties may be, can all of them be attributed to execution, which in this case the prosecution of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia has chosen to classify as a genocidal act? Or are some, or even a significant portion, of Muslim casualties due to other causes and, therefore, in the legal sense should be classified differently?

It is not the purpose of this analysis to try to establish how many inhabitants of the former Srebrenica enclave perished as a result of execution, nor is it to take a position, whatever that number may be, on whether it meets the legal standard for genocide or not.

The purpose of this presentation is to determine the following, based on available Muslim, Serb, and UN and other competent sources:

[a] whether there was combat activity involving significant segments of the enclave population which could have been the cause of substantial casualties on the Muslim side?;[7]

[b] whether there were minefields laid along the path of the Muslim column’s breakthrough from Srebrenica to Tuzla which could also have caused substantial casualties?;

[c] whether according to credible non-Serb and non-Muslim sources the column might have suffered significant legitimate casualties during its retreat which cannot be subsumed under the rubric of genocidal or any other executions?; and

[d] based on available data, can a reliable estimate be made of the likely total of these legitimate Muslim casualties?

II. The legal status of the Muslim column

Setting aside the complex legal questions surrounding the executions of captured prisoners, and the proper classification of such executions under international law, whether it should be considered genocide or placed in some other category, we focus on the 28th Division column. Starting around midnight on July 11, 1995, that column attempted to perform a breakthrough maneuver from the Srebrenica enclave to the Muslim controlled zone in Tuzla.

It is a settled principle of international law that a mixed military/civilian group or column is a legitimate target.

Analysis of the following statements subsequently given by members of that column confirms the column’s mixed military/civilian nature:[8]

Mehanović Hašmir, EDS location of witness statement: 00371774

Hasanović Sead, EDS location of witness statement: 03021141

Avdić Enver, EDS location of witness statement: 00371746

Salihović Selvid, EDS location of witness statement: 00371738

Orić Meho, EDS location of witness statement: 01008156

Muminović Sejdalija, EDS location of witness statement: 00371757

Alić Hasan, EDS location of witness statement: 00371752

Salčinović Sadik, EDS location of witness statement: 02112340

Husić Ramiz, EDS location of witness statement: 00813498

Additional support for the proposition that the column was mixed, military/civilian, is provided by prosecution military expert Richard Butler. In par. 3.21 of his Report dated November 1, 2002, ERN number 03072366, Butler states the view that “depending on the source, 10,000 to 15,000 persons formed a mixed [military and civilian] column…” which sought escape following the Srebrenica-Tuzla route.[9]

It may therefore safely be concluded that the column retreating through the woods from Srebrenica to Tuzla was mixed, military and civilian, and that therefore must be considered a legitimate target.

III. Legitimate combat engagements involving the column

The proposition that there were combat engagements in the course of which a significant number of Srebrenica Muslims perished receives support also from the prosecutor’s chief investigator, Jean-Rene Ruez.

In an interview published in the Montenegrin newspaper Monitor[10], Ruez states the following:

“A significant number [of Muslims] were killed in combat. The Zvornik brigade of the VRS Drina Corps had organized ambushes and that is when it had the most casualties during the entire war. Many were killed while trying to make it through minefields. An unknown number probably committed suicide in fear that they would be tortured before being put to death. It cannot be excluded that some had shot those who may have wanted to surrender.”

Ruez then adds significantly the following thought:

“We shall rely on the number of the people who were executed directly, who were prisoners. They were prisoners, end of story.”

It is debatable whether Ruez and the prosecution ultimately stuck to this plan. The reason they may not have is that consistent reliance on that approach from their point of view probably would not have yielded a satisfactory number of dead bodies.

Further on in the same interview, Ruez makes two very significant statements:

[1] “As for those who perished in the woods, we are compelled to figure that they were killed in battle.” [11]

[2] “For the main part, we believe the witness’ accounts…” [12]

If these two statements by Ruez are accepted, that [1] those who perished in the woods were killed in battle, and that [2] the column was mixed, then certain conclusions follow. The main one is that the column’s losses must be set apart and must not be conflated with those who were, in Ruez’s own terms, “executed directly, who were prisoners.” Casualties associated with the column’s retreat must therefore be deducted from the total of those were massacred or murdered in a genocidal frenzy.

It is also useful to know that Ruez, and by implication the prosecution, place credence in the accounts of witnesses because we shall have quite a few of them to offer to shed light on the nature and extent of these combat-related casualties.

IV. Locations of combat engagements with the column

Ruez’s admission, undoubtedly supported by brigade records and statements of witnesses that were at his disposal, that the Zvornik brigade suffered its greatest number of casualties throughout the war in that four day period while engaging the retreating Muslim Srebrenica column in combat is also highly significant.

To focus on the most obvious conclusions:

First, the column proceeding from the “demilitarized zone” must have been respectably armed in order to inflict such casualties on the Serbian forces trying to engage it.

Second, for the Serbian side to have suffered such significant casualties, the fighting must have been rather fierce. If so, logically that must also have resulted in at least proportionate casualties on the Muslim side.

The next question must therefore be: at what points did those combat engagements take place? That question is put in vain to the prosecution military expert Richard Butler, as evidenced by his response in the trial of Popović et al. on January 23, 2008: [13]

“Q. With respect to your analysis, did you analyse at any time how many military combat engagements were there with respect to the column of Bosnian Muslims that were leaving Srebrenica and Potocari from Susnjari and the VRS?
A. No, sir. I never engaged in a process to do a step-by-step accounting of each particular engagement of the column.”

We are fortunately in a position to help Butler. [14] Based on a review of 33 Muslim witness statements [whose accounts, according to Mr. Ruez above, are to be believed]. They are Srebrenica column members who had made it to Tuzla or other points of safety, and according to them combat engagements with the Serbian side took place during their withdrawal at the following locations:

Kamenica
Konjević Polje
Sandići
Jadar area
Buljin
Forest near Buljin
Baljkovica
Lipanj
Sućeska
Kravica
Kaldrmica
Udrč-Baljkovica road
Snagovo
Jaglić
Crni Vrh
Cerska
Šiljkovic village
Pervani village
Velja Glava

V. Combat activity along the path of retreat

According to statements given by column survivors to various authorities upon reaching the Muslim controlled zone, there was constant combat along the column’s path from the Srebrenica enclave practically all the way to Tuzla.

It should be noted that based on our research of EDS materials, we were able to locate only 33 statements bearing on this issue. It is reasonable to assume that there must be hundreds more in various archives. Debriefing is standard operating procedure under these circumstances. Several thousand members of the column had made it to Muslim controlled territory and it is safe to assume that very many, if not most, of them—but certainly more than 33—were interviewed by various authorities and gave them statements on what they had observed.

In addition, we have reason to believe that at least 7 similar statements, describing observations along the retreat route, are in the files of Human Rights Watch. [15] A request has been sent to Human Rights Watch to provide these statements, but they have not responded.

But even the relatively scant data base of 33 witnesses offers a dramatic picture of fierce combat and severe human casualties all along the column’s withdrawal route.

ENGAGEMENT SITES AND ESTIMATED CASUALTIES ACCORDING TO SURVIVOR REPORTS

Kamenica
Ademović Ševal: 200—250
Alić Hasan: 7 dead, 7 gravely wounded
Dedic Sulejman: great number of dead and wounded
Hasanović Sead: “many” bodies observed, at least 100 near the brook
Jusufović Azmir: 300 killed, 100 wounded
Kovačević Sadik: about 200 casualties
Memišević Nurif: 2000—3000 dead
Muminović Behudin: 6 corpses
Muratović Kadrija: “thousands” of dead
Osmanović Ramo: several hundred killed and 300—400 wounded
Ramić Sado: about 1000 casualties
Salkić Abdulah: several hundred casualties

Konjevic Polje
Ademović Bekit: “many bodies”
Alić Melvid: many dead and wounded along road to Baljkovica
Smajlović Muhamed: estimated 500—1000 killed

Lipanj
Hasanović Sead: “many dead bodies”

Sandići
Muminović Behudin: saw mass burial of about 500 bodies
Smajlović Muhamed: estimated 200 dead
Zukanović Bego: saw 5 die; later “several” killed

Jadar area
Jusufović Azmir: some killed, no estimate

Buljin
Avdić Enver: 1000 casualties
Kovačević Sadik: 30 casualties
Mehanović Hasmir: about 100 killed
Memišević Nurif: many skeletons and parts of bodies
Osmanović Nazif: 100 dead and many wounded
Ramić Sado: 50 casualties
Smajlović Muhamed: 30 killed, 45 injured

Forest near Buljin
Mehanović Hasmir: 20 dead males

Šušnjar area
Mustafić Husejn: “hundreds of casualties”

Baljkovica
Dedić Sulejman: corpses and unpleasant odor
Hakić Nermin: saw men getting killed, no estimate
Mehanović Hasmir: 5 dead soldiers and civilians
Mustafić Husejn: 5 dead
Salkić Abdulah: on route from Kamenica, several hundred corpses
Smajlović Muhamed: many black and swollen corpses

Sućeska
Alic Melvid: pounded by artillery, no casualty estimate

Kravica
Ademović Ševal: “many dead and wounded”
Husić Ramiz: 12 suicides
Kadrić Midhat: “great number of killed”
Memišević Nurif: “many people” killed and maimed in artillery shelling
Mustafić Husejn: “many dead and dismembered corpses”
Orić Fadil: “several hundred” casualties

Kaldrmica
Halilović Suljo: 1000 dead and several hundred wounded

Udrč-Baljkovica road
Salihović Selvid: “several hundred corpses”

Crni Vrh
Hakić Nermin: observed men getting killed all long route from Srebrenica

Snagovo
Ademović Ševal: dead bodies and many wounded
Dedić Sulejman: great number of dead giving off unpleasant odor
Jusupović Šefik: 18 killed
Osmanović Nazif: “many dead and wounded”

Jaglić
Halilović Osman: heard of many dead and wounded
Muratović Kadrija: 3 dead and many wounded

Šiljković village
Halilović Osman: heard there were 30 dead, 42 wounded

Pervani village
Memišević Nurif: 6 dead

Velja Glava
Ramić Sado: 20 dead

Lolići Road
Memisević Nurif: 200 dead

Cerska
Avdić Enver: about 100

Unidentified location[s]
Alić Hasan: about 1000 casualties 8 km from Kamenica
Efendić Mensur: Observed dozens of corpses all along the route
Halilović Osman: Observed 30—40 corpses and 20 suicides
Husić Ramiz: 44 bodies, 10 wounded
Jusupović Šefik: “hundreds of dead Muslims” in the woods
Kovačević Sadik: about 300
Kadrić Midhat: about 500 killed
Muratović Kadrija: dead and dismembered bodies in the woods
Orić Meho: 70 dead
Salčinović Sadik: 6 dead
Vejzović Gadafi: “hundreds of dead bodies” in the woods
Muminović Sejdalija: 5 dead at one point and “considerable number” of casualties and wounded at another

A summary assessment of these casualties will be presented at the end. Obviously, these observations and estimates have to be treated with great caution and they should not be invested with a degree of precision which they cannot possibly claim. But they project a powerful impression of frequent clashes and enormous human losses generated by those clashes. Those loses must be accorded a distinct legal character and they must have their separate place in the casualty ledger.

VI. The presence of minefields in the column’s path

In our primary information source about the column and the losses it faced, the 33 statements given by survivors, we find references to the presence of minefields and to the casualties those mines inflicted. The following Muslim witnesses specifically mention minefields:

Hasanović Sead: expressed fear of landmines;
Jusufović Azmir: passage to Muslim side had to be demined
Efendić Mensur
Memićević Nurif
Husić Ramiz: crossed a minefield with a large group

In fact, the column’s retreat route was so strewn with minefields, that according to prosecution military expert Richard Butler the retrieval of the remains of those who were killed by the mines in the remoter areas was hampered “because of the ordinance and mine threat.” [16]

In addition to the statements of the column survivors, there is also an apparent log entry of a staff member of the 28th division which makes a reference to the presence of mines. It states:

“The column set off from Jaglic and Vejz went through a minefield at Buljina, clearly marking it with cloths and items of clothing. Vejz led the column and we all went to Udrč. The division staff, president of the municipality Osman SULJIĆ and Eljub GALIĆ, and I were at the back.”[17]

Serb sources also extensively refer to the presence of minefields. The following is an overview:

[1] Mirroring Muslim report above, a July 13, 1995, report to the command of Drina Corps states:

“On 12 July of this year, at 1945 hours, a radio network of elements of the 28th Muslim Division was activated; during the morning, at around 0500 hours, these elements came across our minefield in the sector of /?Ravni Buljim/ at the juncture between the Milić and Bratunac Brigades.”[18]

[2] In the same vein, the presence of minefields is marked on the Bratunac Brigade minefield map which was presented as a prosecution exhibit in the Blagojević case. [19]

[3] While the Bratunac Brigade minefield map deals with the location of mines the Muslim column had to cross during the first phase of its trek, there is also evidence that the danger from mines was unabated as it reached the zone of responsibility of the Zvornik Brigade, further to the north. [20] The fact that there were minefields in the Zvornik Brigade zone that the column had to face was confirmed by Brano Djurić, a member of the Zvornik Brigade engineering battalion. He also claims to have made sketches of the minefields’ locations. [21] According to Djuric, there were even Serb casualties as a result of the broad distribution of these mines.

[4] The fact that Zvornik Brigade possessed a supply of mines is documented. [22]

[5] A log kept by military police commander Ljubiša Borovčanin shows that the enclave’s approaches were mined and that a path had to be cleared to allow access to Serb motorized forces:

“Between 0500 and 0630 hours, the pioneers of the Bratunac Brigade, led by Captain GAVRIĆ, cleared a passage through a mine-field or groups of mines towards Budak or immediately around the Žuti Most-Potočari road. Members of the 1st Company of the Zvornik Special Police Unit, led by a pioneer from the Bratunac Brigade, set off through the cleared passages towards Potočari to create the conditions for the introduction of hardware. As personnel were being introduced, a sapper stepped on a PROM /anti-personnel bouncing fragmentation mine/-1. He was taken to the Bratunac Health Centre, where he died. In a way, this incident slowed down the advance.” [23]

Again, it is noted that the mines were so numerous that they even caused a Serbian casualty.

[6] Bratunac Brigade security and intelligence officer Momir Nikolić reports that he was informed of the Muslim column’s movement “through minefields across combat lines in the direction of Konjević Polje.” [24] It should be noted that Nikolić is a prosecution witness and that the “Statement of facts” where this assertion is made was written by him most likely in cooperation with the Office of the Prosecutor.

[7] There is also a Zvornik Brigade report dated July 8, 1995, on “minefield maintenance…in progress,” which logically implies the existence of minefields in the brigade’s zone of responsibility. [25]

[8] The fact that the Srebrenica enclave was surrounded by minefields is confirmed by Radenko Ubiparipović in the course of U.S. Immigration Court removal proceedings, where he stated that: “There were mines surrounding the entire safe area. Both sides laid mines.” [26]

[9] The abundance of mines and minefields is confirmed also by prosecution witness DP-105 at the Blagojević trial. He said that there were “many minefields,” [27] that some of the minefields in the area had been laid during earlier battles,[28] and that minefields were present in the Konjević Polje area,[29] which may be significant because of the mass crossing of the Konjević Polje road and the enormous casualties which it produced.

Again, this Serb witness notes that even Serb forces, which had laid the mines, had to move slowly in their deployment to engage the Muslim column because “the terrain we had to cross was very inaccessible, and there were the minefields.” [30] He also said, astonishingly, that “this area contained minefields that we did not know the location of, and that is what put a restriction on our movement along certain roads, like village roads and things like that.” [31]

[10] Col. Nedeljko Trkulja, in his ICTY interview, stated that after the decision was made to create a corridor for the passage of the Muslim column on July 16, 1995, a path had to be cleared for it through the minefields. [32]

[11] Zoran Jovanović, also affirms in relation to the enclave perimeter, that “In front of the defense line, there were minefields. And it would take a lot of time to clear the minefields, to remove the mines, to enable them to go through. We had to remove the mines in at least one section of that field to let the troops past.” [33] The reference is to Serb troops advancing toward Srebrenica, but obviously the same principle also operates in reverse.

Further on, he refers to the presence of “minefields everywhere, both in front of our defense lines and in front of the enemy’s defense line…nobody dared to do a proper search of the terrain.” [34]

To summarize, it would appear indisputable that minefields were located in the path of the retreating column. There is evidence from a variety of sources that the column came into contact with minefields and that some of its casualties were inflicted by mines. There is also evidence that mines were so abundantly and widely dispersed that even Serb forces, which had laid them, were obliged to exercise extreme caution, and indeed had suffered casualties from what probably were their own mines.

VII. Reports of casualties suffered by the retreating Muslim column

After presenting evidence that the Muslim column retreating from Srebrenica was engaged in combat, that it had to cross numerous minefields, and that it admittedly had suffered considerable casualties, it becomes appropriate to review the opinions of some contemporary and expert observers concerning the extent of those casualties.

1. The most contemporary authoritative source available on this subject is the report written by a UN official in Tuzla, Edward Joseph, on July 17, 1995, and directed to Michel Moussalli at the UNPROFOR office in Tuzla. Joseph refers in his report to the arrival of “Srebrenica men” in Tuzla and comments that “5 to 6 thousand crossed into BiH 2 Corps controlled- territory in the southern Sapna area last night (16 July).” He then continues: “Up to three thousand were killed on the way, mostly by mines and BSA engagements. Unknown others were captured. Some committed suicide. Unknown others went to Zepa.”[35]

2. In the evidence he gave in the Popović trial, prosecution military expert Richard Butler claimed that he had not made an analysis of BH military casualties.[36] He denied specifically having studied the question of casualties that may have been suffered by the column as a result of landmines. [37] He also denied having made any accounting of the military engagements which could have given rise to casualties on the Muslim side. [38] Under cross examination, he did concede the mixed character of the column and its status as a legitimate target. [39] Butler conceded also based on his “knowledge of the situation, that the number [of casualties] would be high for any particular combat engagement.” [40] Pressed to offer his own reasonable estimate of column losses, given those combat engagements, Butler responded that “I am not aware of any specific number, but that particular number of 1000 to 2000 sounds reasonable, given the context of the combat that I am aware of.” [41] He confined this casualty estimate to the period of 12 to 18 July, 1995. [42]

3. Additional estimates are to be found in the “UNMO HQ Daily Sitrep,” dated July 18, 1995. [43] It was prepared by a certain Captain Hassan. It is apparently a BH wide situation report, summarizing reports from UNPROFOR observers located in different areas of the country. On p. 19, under the heading of “Other significant/relevant information,” reports from the Srebrenica area are summarized. It is stated that on 10—11 July between 12,000 and 15,000 men had left the enclave, of whom about 3,000 were armed. It is estimated that 3,000 “are believed to have been killed by minefields, snipers, and ambush conflict with BSA.” A specific BSA ambush in Konjević Polje is referred to. A comment is added that these figures are likely to be exaggerated in relation to those leaving and who were armed and that the numbers should be divided by ten. No explanation is given for this recommendation to drastically reduce the figures which apparently were gleaned from interviews with column survivors, and there is no particular reason to follow it in this case.

Just as in the case of reports by direct participants in the march from Srebrenica to Tuzla, great caution should be exercised in relation to the numbers offered by foreign observers and experts. But even their estimates of the column’s casualties range from 1000 to 3000. Even if the lower or a median figure were accepted, that would still constitute a sizeable portion of the human losses allegedly suffered by the Muslim side during the relevant period. That figure would necessarily have to be deducted from the Srebrenica total of those claimed to have been executed contrary to the laws and customs of war.

Endnotes:

[1] http://humanrightsdoctorate.blogspot.com/2009/07/judge-flugge-of-icty-on-genocide-in.html

[2] http://www.bosniak.org/cnab-demands-removal-of-icty-judge-christoph-flugge/

[3] Dani, 31/7/2009

[4] Gen. Lewis MacKenzie, the first UNPROFOR commander in Bosnia, shared this general view: “More than 2,000 bodies have been recovered in and around Srebrenica, and they include victims of the three years of intense fighting in the area. The math just doesn’t support the scale of 8,000 killed.” Globe and Mail [Toronto], July 14, 2005.

[5] A parallel concern seems to be that Sweden is taking over the rotating EU presidency for a six-month period, raising fears within the Bosnian Muslim community that its “management” might be infected by Mr. Bildt’s negative views: http://greatersurbiton.wordpress.com/2009/07/21/swedish-foreign-minister-carl-bildt-denies-over-half-the-srebrenica-massacre/

[6] This is with apologies to some Muslim commentators who would prefer to make all debate on this subject simply go away: “Opinions are cheap. Everybody has them, yet they are not worth much. On the other hand, Srebrenica genocide is not a matter of anybody’s opinion; it’s a judicial fact recognized first by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, and subsequently by the International Court of Justice. End of story.” See: http://bgdw.wordpress.com/

[7] In the opinion of prosecution military expert Richard Butler, “I would think that from my knowledge of the situation, that that number [of casualties from legitimate military engagements] would be high for any particular combat engagements,” Popović et al., Transcript, January 23, 1008, p. 20250, lines 23—25.

[8] Number references are to EDS [Electronic Disclosure System], ICTY document data base.

[9] Butler admitted specifically the mixed nature of the column and its character as a legitimate target in his testimony in Popović, Transcript, p. 20244, lines 19—25 and 20245, line 1.

[10] Monitor, April 19, 2001; ERN number 06038344

[11] Ibid.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Popović et al., Transcript, January 23, 2008, at p. 20243

[14] Popović et al., Transcript, January 23, 2008, p. 20244, lines 7—18.

[15]
[1] Ekrem Salihović, Tuzla, July 24, 1996
[2] Mensur Memić, Tuzla, July 24, 1996
[3] Ramiz Masić, Tuzla, July 3, 1996
[4] Senad Grabovica, Tuzla, July 24, 1996
[5] Muhamed Matkić, Gornja Tuzla, July 19, 1996
[6] Dr. Ilijaz Pilav, Vogošća, July 24, 1996
[7] Ramiz Bećirović, Živinice, July 1996

[16] Popović et al., Transcript, p. 20252, lines 17—20 and 24—25 and 20253, line 1.

[17] ERN number 0308-3682

[18] ERN number 0308-3838

[19] Blagojevic and Jokic, OPT exhibit 617

[20] It is important to document the presence of mines in the Zvornik Brigade area because under cross-examination prosecution military expert Richard Butler stuck to the view that “we were able to conclude, particularly with respect to Zvornik, that the individuals that were coming out of these particular mass graves and the associated secondaries…were not meeting the characteristics of combat casualties, in fact they were meeting the characteristics of victims from crime scenes,” Popović et al., Transcript, p. 20250, lines 6—10.

[21] Blagojević and Jokić, 15 July 2004, Transcript, p. 11,963—11,979.

[22] ERN number 0084-6748.

[23] ERN number 0308-2252

[24] ERN number R042-7397

[25] ERN number 0081-1224

[26] U.S. Immigration Court removal proceedings, In matter of Radenko Ubiparipović, File A 75 067 541, p. 132.

[27] Blagojević and Jokić, 3 June 2004, Transcript, p. 10,265

[28] Ibid., p. 10,264.

[29] Ibid. p. 10,222.

[30] Ibid., 1 June 2004, p. 10,075

[31] Ibid., 1 June 2004, p, 10,082

[32] ICTY Interview with Nedeljko Trkulja, 28 September 2005, p. 10.