It is hard to say to what extent the Dutch text which follows in English translation is a reflection of the July 5, 2011 decision of the Court of Appeals in the Hague in the tort action brought against the Dutch state on behalf of Srebrenica victims Nuhanović and Mustafić. The appellate chamber in that case set aside the trial decision whereby the suit for damages was thrown out of court. Although the appellate chamber tried to limit the impact of its decision to the present case, arguing that there was a special relationship between the victims and the Dutch battalion which entitled the former to protection, the fact remains that an important procedural door was opened and a principle was established.
Contrary to the position championed by Dutch jurisprudence until quite recently in analogous situations (the Mothers of Srebrenica suit as well as our NGO’s for Dutchbat’s failure to protect Moslems and Serbs, respectively) which held that the Netherlands could not be held liable because it was acting under the aegis of the United Nations, what we now have – to use the terminology of a leading Dutch jurist Alexander Knoops – is a “new legal situation.” Regardless of the eventual scope of application of the appellate court decision, the following may be stated with certainty: the superior chamber of the Dutch court has recognized the principle that the Dutch state is liable for the conduct of its soldiers in Srebrenica during the recent conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina and that therefore it may be held liable for damages arising from their conduct or failure to act in conformity with their duties.
To what extent the analysis that follows (it was originally written in 2011) may reflect Dutch unease over the possibility of having to pay astronomical indemnities to the Mothers of Srebrenica for the questionable number of victims that they claim is a matter of conjecture. (Suffice it to mention that on July 10, 2011 the leading Dutch public opinion survey agency, Maurice de Hond, published their finding that eight out of ten Dutch citizens surveyed were opposed to the Dutch state paying any indemnity at all to the victims’ families.) But what we may conclude with a high level of certainty is the following. With regard to what happened in Srebrenica, the Dutch view is shifting. Moreover, by publishing this “heretical” text precisely on July 11, the most sacred anniversary day for the proponents of the official Srebrenica narrative, the Dutch have acted with unusual boldness. Everyone who is familiar with the climate of opinion and stringent norms of political correctness in the Netherlands with regard to Srebrenica will appreciate that analyses of the type that follows would have been virtually unthinkable in that country even a month before the judgment. Nobody would have dared to write anything of the sort, nor would anyone have had the courage to publish it.
But now, NRC the leading Dutch internet portal and media organization, has done precisely that.
Srebrenica: new insights
The arrest of Mladić revives discussion on the tragedy of Srebrenica in July 1995. Based on personal observations Rene Gremaux adds new arguments to the discussion.
By Rene Gremaux
In the Opinion and Debate section of NRC[1] Kees van den Bosch and Huub Jaspers (June 5) and Erna Rijsdijk (June 7) claim that the capture of Bosnian town and the massacre that followed were done with premeditation while Hans Blom (June 1, more in his interview with De Volkskrant of May 28) correctly argues that the Bosnian Serb entry was not planned well in advance, and even less so the mass executions. According to the former head of the NIOD investigation into the July 1995 Srebrenica events, Mladić was enraged about the surreptitious departure of the majority of Muslim men from the enclave. His objective was to take prisoners of war. The shooting of the captured Muslims of fighting age was an unintended consequence, according to Blom. What started spontaneously in unexpected circumstances, was then systematically continued and completed. That is the core of the professor’s argument.
Thе fact that this historian dared to offer an analytical framework to explain the cruelties of the Bosnian war, which was contrary to the moralistic Dutch image on Srebrenica, reflects some progress on that issue. Yet his comments on the impact of Mladić’s anger are not convincing. This requires a review of the context in which Srebrenica occurred, which I will now try to sketch on the basis of results of my own investigations in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia.
Starting point
In the hot summer of 1995 the untenability of Srebrenica and other enclaves painfully came to light. Earlier, the Muslim government in Sarajevo refused to alleviate the plight of tens of thousands of refugees in Srebrenica by allowing their evacuation to Central Bosnia. As evidenced by his contribution to the NRC last June 7, Joris Voorhoeve, Minister of Defence at the time, was originally in favor of this solution. In Sarajevo, however, his initiative was flatly refused, because this would imply cooperation with ethnic cleansing. What the outside world preferred to misperceive as a humanitarian issue, for the Republika Srpska was a very serious military and strategic question. Repeatedly, the Srebrenica enclave, which was demilitarized in name only, was used by the Muslims inside it, sometimes reinforced by civilian men and women, as a base for provocative and murderous military assaults on the surrounding Serb villages. To combat and prevent the joining of Srebrenica and the neighboring southern enclave of Žepa with the rest of the Muslims dominated areas, many Bosnian Serb forces were tied down, while their army along the main front lines was facing the full burden of conducting the war hampered by a great shortage of military personnel.
Surprised
Given the situation as outlined above, the Bosnian Serb leadership were keen to find a solution. Great was the surprise when in the second week of July 1995 Srebrenica was captured by a relatively small, not very heavily armed force, which was actually operating only on the south side of the enclave. What actually happened? The leadership of the 28th Division in Srebrenica-based Muslim army was ordered back to Sarajevo.
Thus the protection of tens of thousands of Muslims in the enclave in fact was largely left to the small and weak Dutch battalion. Apparently the political and military leadership of Bosnian Muslims were not really afraid of Serbian revenge and arbitrariness, let alone of the implementation of any genocidal plan.
Or it could it be that they were left behind deliberately to be sacrificed for a “higher” purpose?
Flight
Shortly before July 11th the vast majority of the male Muslim population of fighting age, led by active military, took to flight, refusing to assemble in the Dutch base in Potočari. Firstly, there was fear of being called to account for atrocities committed against Serb prisoners of war and civilians. At the same time, the main Muslim army did not want to lose men unnecessarily as prisoners of war. Everyone was desperately needed for the combat that was going on elsewhere. After a long, terrible trek barely half of perhaps 15,000 in Srebrenica men and older boys who left managed to reach Muslim-controlled territory, mostly around Tuzla.
Anger?
But what happened to the rest, who did not reach safety, one could ask? The Dutch media invariably point to mass executions as their only cause of death. According to Mr. Blom the alleged Serbian murderousness following the fall of Srebrenica is explained by Mladić’s intense anger about the military age men’s escape. Yet there is much that is inconsistent in the image of Mladić as a man of great wrath who wanted to put all Muslim men to the sword. The head of the hospital located in Milići could extended medical care to wounded Muslims from Srebrenica. I spoke with him and found out that after recovering many patients later expressed their gratitude. In Tuzla I was told by young Muslim men from Srebrenica who actually had fallen into the Serbs’ hands as prisoners of war, that they were treated correctly. When Mladić shortly after the capture of Srebrenica went on to Žepa, he refused to take with him men who had reason for revenge. The Serbian takeover of the nearby small Muslim enclave went with little or no bloodshed. For an explanation of the terrible crimes committed in the aftermath of the takeover of the Muslim enclave of Srebrenica, we should consider something else besides the possible criminal intent of Mladić and his men. For instance, not infrequently, small numbers of Serb guards were put in charge of hundreds of Muslim men who had surrendered. In at least in one such case a Muslim from the crowd of prisoners managed to kill a guard, after which all hell broke loose.
Death squads
It is obvious that Srebrenica fell when the Western powers were looking for a pretext to enter the conflict on the side of the Bosnian Muslims, as well as the Croats, which would enable them to give their protégés massive and open military assistance. It is unlikely that Mladić would in such circumstances knowingly hand his opponents a casus belli on a silver platter. There was simply no chance that crimes of the scope as alleged could be effectively concealed. It soon turned out that for Mladić Srebrenica was a Pyrrhic victory and actually became the long-sought stick with which to beat the Serbs. Soon, with NATO air support elsewhere in Bosnia-Herzegovina Muslims and Croats were on the march. All the more reason to investigate in greater detail evidence of the involvement of intelligence services in the Srebrenica massacre. Several witnesses refer to the fact that the shadowy figures involved in death squad killings were rewarded with gold or money. If that is true, then neither the blood-lust and the desire for revenge attributed to the Serbs, nor the alleged fury of their commander, can serve as a sufficient explanation for these events.
Endnotes:
[1] NRC, http://www.nrc.nl/, is the leading internet media portal in the Netherlands.