The “demilitarization” of military forces in the Srebrenica enclave under Sarajevo’s command, agreed on in April and May 1933, was a sham. That was recognized even by ICTY in the Krstić judgment, par. 24:
“The Trial Chamber heard credible and largely uncontested evidence of a consistent refusal by the Bosnian Muslims to abide by the agreement to demilitarise the “safe area”.37 Bosnian Muslim helicopters flew in violation of the no-fly zone;38 the ABiH opened fire toward Bosnian Serb lines and moved through the “safe area”;39 the 28th Division was continuously arming itself40 ; and at least some humanitarian aid coming into the enclave was appropriated by the ABiH.41 To the Bosnian Serbs it appeared that Bosnian Muslim forces in Srebrenica were using the “safe area” as a convenient base from which to launch offensives against the VRS and that UNPROFOR was failing to take any action to prevent it.42 General Halilovic admitted that Bosnian Muslim helicopters had flown in violation of the no-fly zone and that he had personally dispatched eight helicopters with ammunition for the 28th Division. In moral terms, he did not see it as a violation of the “safe area” agreement given that the Bosnian Muslims were so poorly armed to begin with.43 “
That conclusion was, for a change, correct. The following document was a mobilization order issued to males of military age by Srebrenica authorities under Sarajevo’s control in 1995, as tensions rose prior to the Serbian attack on the enclave in July of that year. It speaks for itself. The document is from the files of the Hague Tribunal and bears ICTY’s archival codes, and was evidently turned over to the Republic of Srpska Srebrenica Commission in May 2004.
Srebrenica Draft English