Newly declassified US government documents contemporaneous with Srebrenica events in July of 1995, contrary to expectation, contain no hint that an unfolding war crime of genocidal magnitude was on the radar of high government officials and intelligence and other agencies. At the November 1995 Bosnian peace conference in Dayton, Ohio, four months after the fall of Srebrenica, neither a Srebrenica massacre of huge proportions nor genocide were subjects of deliberation. There was speculation in the New York Times on October 29, 1995, on the eve of the peace conference, that a “reconstruction of the fall of Srebrenica and the ensuing massacres, based on survivors’ accounts, NATO and United Nations documents and interviews in Bosnia, Serbia, Washington and New York, leaves little doubt about what happened” and that consequently “the question of Serbian accountability promises to haunt the Bosnian peace talks that are to begin Wednesday at an Air Force base in Ohio.” However, that prediction was not borne out by the peace conference proceedings. The issue of Srebrenica as a place of great suffering for Bosnian Muslims was not even raised by President Alija Izetbegovic, nor was any effort made by the Bosnian Muslim delegation to extract concessions on account of it. Indeed, an analysis of Bosnian Muslim reports on the fall of Srebrenica and its aftermath reveals that, for almost a year after the event, they were strangely reticent about referring to these events in the dramatic terms to which the international public became accustomed later.
With the notable exception of the Hague Tribunal, which reacted to Srebrenica events almost contemporaneously (more about that later), in the political and policy-making circles which in July of 1995 must have followed attentively developments on the ground in Bosnia, before August 4, 1995, the day the Croatian Operation Storm operation against Krajina Serbs was initiated, there was no explicit recognition that anything extraordinary had occurred. This timeline raises important questions. What triggered the precocious reaction of ICTY, which did not even have an intelligence infrastructure and aerial surveillance apparatus at its disposal? What accounts for the tardy (and in the context of the just initiated Croatian offensive, with its massive violations of humanitarian law, politically very suspicious) reaction of US government agencies, which certainly did have the means to follow ground events in real time?
The Clinton Library has released a number of declassified documents containing notes of high level interagency staff meetings, presidential conversations, and policy papers pertaining to the conflict in Bosnia in 1995. Declassified released documents pertaining to their perception of the situation in Eastern Bosnia in July and August of 1995 are of particular interest for Srebrenica research. They shed light on the official assessment of events as they unfolded in that war theater and give clues about policy makers’ objectives and level of awareness or concern about specific developments on the ground.
The main topics of concern and policy analysis in these documents can be summarized thus:
- Unilateral v. multilateral Bosnian arms embargo lift;
- French proposal to retake Srebrenica after its July 11 fall to Serbian forces (never “taken seriously,” according to US UN Ambassador Madeleine Albright);
- Concern that the French might pull out of the Western coalition on Bosnia, leading to a domino effect;
- Fear of a complete or partial UNPROFOR withdrawal from Bosnia;
- Effort to write off Srebrenica and shift focus to Gorazde and securing Sarajevo from anticipated Serb attack; and
- Laying the groundwork for a political settlement of the Bosnian conflict.
In the bundle entitled “Documents concerning genocide,” there are several dozen documents about the situation in Eastern Bosnia, dating mostly from July and August of 1995. Relatively few of them contain references to Srebrenica, and while in some there are references to human rights violations, contrary to what the title implies there are no allegations of genocide. More documents on the same subject can be found in the Clinton Digital Library, Bosnian Declassified Records.
What follows is a brief review and discussion of these documents. Items cited are from “Documents concerning genocide,” with page numbers.
In his July 13, 1995, telephone conversation with French President Jacques Chirac, US President Bill Clinton does not make reference to major atrocities or human rights violations following the Serb takeover of Srebrenica. Rather, he argues against Chirac’s proposal to militarily retake Srebrenica.
“Our military advisers,” he tells Chirac, “say there are significant hazards in attempting to land a force with helicopters in Srebrenica and that UNPROFOR might be better off securing Gorazde first…”
He goes on to point out that “the Bosnian Government has 9000 troops in Gorazde, who apparently are willing to fight. In Srebrenica there were about 3000 Bosnian troops but, as you know, they left under pressure of shelling. They left without putting up a fight, although I think they could have done so. The British have 300 troops in Gorazde, so I think they will be more inclined to take a stand there.” [Page 8]
Clinton stated clearly his awareness that Bosnian army garrisons were present in both Srebrenica and Gorazde, although he should have known that in Srebrenica at least that was illegal under the enclave demilitarization agreements. Not unreasonably, he articulates the US position that Bosnian troops should take the lead in fighting against the Serbs, a burden which, in his view, they had not borne adequately:
“We cannot defend democratic values in the abstract. My military advisers tell me the Muslims could have made a hell of a fight in Srebrenica and raised the price of the Serbs’ occupation, but they wouldn’t do it. We can’t fight just because the UN says they are ‘safe areas’. We can’t send the Muslims back and commit ourselves to stay forever if they won’t defend themselves.” [Pages 9-10]
Clinton continues: “If we intervene to regain the enclaves on their behalf and they won’t fight, how do we keep them open? UNPROFOR’s mission would be completely changed and you would have entered into combat on the side of the Bosnian Government when they don’t fight for themselves.” [Page 10]
Curiously, some of Chirac’s responses in this conversation with Clinton are blacked out.
Documents reflect that over the next several days, while in Srebrenica major atrocities rising to the level of genocide were allegedly taking place, Western governments were preparing a conference in London to agree on further steps to put the situation in Bosnia under control.
White House Situation Room documents dated July 14 1995 contain diplomatic cables with inter-governmental communications to lay the groundwork for the planned London conference. [Pages 27-32] The main issue referred to in the cables is the disagreement between British and French governments on the feasibility of retaking Srebrenica. Again, there is no hint of awareness or even speculation of major atrocities taking place on the ground.
The London conference was finally held on July 21, 1995, ten days after the fall of Srebrenica and several days after the completion of the alleged genocide.
The results of the conference were summed up in a US government cable that was sent out to NATO allies:
“WE WENT TO LONDON CONVINCED THAT THE STATUS QUO IN BOSNIA WAS UNTENABLE AND THAT ONLY STRONG AND DECISIVE ACTION WOULD BE SUFFICIENT TO HALT SERB AGGRESSION, RESTORE UNPROFOR’S EFFECTIVENESS, AND REESTABLISH CONDITIONS THAT COULD LEAD TO A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. WE WERE PARTICULARLY DETERMINED THAT CLEAR DECISIONS BE TAKEN TO PREVENT THE BOSNIAN SERBS FROM ATTACKING THE LAST REMAINING SAFE AREA IN EASTERN BOSNIA, GORAZDE, AND THAT MEASURES BE ADOPTED FOR RELIEVING THE SERBS’ SIEGE OF SARAJEVO.” [Pages. 21-22] Again, there was no reference to Srebrenica or anything out of the ordinary known to be taking place there.
The laid back attitude about possible grave violations of international law and the Genocide Convention after the fall of Srebrenica is best exemplified by the US Department of State “Discussion Paper: Elements of a Post-UNPROFOR Strategy; Support the Federation; Contain the Conflict” [pages 33-41]. The Discussion Paper was a recapitulation and adaptation to current conditions of a May 23 Principals Committee meeting on Bosnian policy. According to the paper’s summary of major issues of policy concern as of July 14, while a genocide was allegedly in progress: “Principals agreed that all these elements of a possible post-UNPROFOR strategy need further analysis, as do several other questions including: What relief and other military operations could or should remain in place? How would we work with Allies and friends to contain the fighting? What are Russia’s likely responses to our efforts to lift the arms embargo and bolster the security of Bosnia-Herzegovina?” [Page 33] Again, there is no mention of awareness of an incipient Srebrenica genocide.
The first suggestion in this batch of documents that in the aftermath of the July 11 fall of Srebrenica killing on a major scale may have taken place there is recorded on July 25, 1995. It was triggered by a dispatch on the same date by Peter Galbraith, US Ambassador in Zagreb, Croatia [pages 18-20]. Galbraith draws his superiors’ attention to information he received through “a UN official” about an interview conducted with a Srebrenica refugee in Tuzla who alleged that at the location of Konjevic Polje “Bosnian Serbs have massacred many, if not most, of the 5,000 plus military age men in their custody following the fall of Srebrenica.”
However, the statements of the “highly credible” source cited by Galbraith appear doubtful in light of the map of execution sites and mass graves published by ICTY chief investigator Jean-Rene Ruez. According to that map, there were no executions in Konjevic Polje. The nearest mass graves, according to Ruez, were located in Cerska and Nova Kasaba. Though what Galbraith transmitted in his diplomatic cable was very likely a false or exaggerated report, it still appears that no official mention of major Srebrenica atrocities had been made prior to July 25. And even then, the report consisted of an account by a single individual. It lacked the precision that could have been provided by arguably more reliable intelligence or technological surveillance assets.
Apparently on the strength of Galbraith’s report from Zagreb, on July 30 US Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights John Shattuck was sent to Tuzla to conduct an investigation, interviewing as he stated “about twenty, perhaps fewer” Srebrenica refugees. The modest dossier assembled by Shattuck soon had further repercussions. On August 4, 1995, a document with the dramatic title “Memorandum for Anthony Lake from Rob Malley, Subject: Human Rights Atrocities in Bosnia” [page 15] is reproduced in our collection. Anthony Lake, be it recalled, was Clinton’s national security adviser at the time.
Suddenly, after weeks of studious silence, in a memorandum submitted to the national security advisor it is alleged that “There is increasingly solid evidence of atrocities committed by the Bosnian Serb army during its attack on Srebrenica and Zepa. During a mission to central and northeastern Bosnia, A/S Shattuck was able to confirm through interviews with refugees reports and intelligence we have been receiving. Approximately 12,000 persons from the two former enclaves are still missing and unaccounted for. Hundreds, perhaps up to a thousand, persons (principally men and boys) appear to have been killed in mass executions.” This is the first recorded use of the “men and boys” meme that ultimately became integral to the Srebrenica narrative. As for the “intelligence we have been receiving,” there is actually no trace of it in the released documents nor, as the analysis of their content shows, was there any reference to or suggestion of awareness of any such intelligence in prior official communications.
Nevertheless, Galbraith’s single witness and Shattuck’s whirlwind visit to Tuzla apparently supplied US policy makers with sufficient data to warrant a Presidential Statement by Bill Clinton on August 4, 1995. It followed closely guidelines set in Malley’s memorandum to Anthony Lake, but was confined to general charges and avoided specific figures cited in the memorandum [pages 16-17]. Even so, Clinton’s rhetoric began with some bone-chilling, though factually unsupported, allegations: “Evidence is mounting every day of unspeakable atrocities committed by Bosnian Serb armed forces during their attack on Srebrenica and Zepa. There are reports of mass executions, beatings, rape, sexual abuse and other flagrant violations of human rights and international humanitarian law. Thousands of civilians from Srebrenica and Zepa are missing and unaccounted for. As I have made clear before, the United States condemns these outrageous actions in the strongest terms.”
There are at least two chronological oddities here that merit attention. The first is the timing of the US officials’ disclosure of their unequivocal knowledge that after the fall of Srebrenica grave violations of humanitarian law had occurred. Significantly, August 4, 1995, also happened to be the day when “Operation Storm” against Krajina Serb enclaves was launched by Croatian armed forces, trained by the US “retired officers” contractor firm MPRI and equipped by the US and its NATO associates. On August 10, while “Operation Storm” was still in progress, resulting in the expulsion and flight of an estimated 250,000 Krajina Serbs from their homes, US representative in the UN Madeleine Albright addressed the Security Council. She did not call the meeting to discuss the humanitarian crisis in Croatia but to denounce alleged Serb atrocities in Srebrenica, nearly a month earlier, and waved satellite photographs which no one was allowed to examine closely. The photographic evidence was quickly put under a long-term embargo so as not to “compromise intelligence gathering methods.”
This sequence of events suggests strongly that Srebrenica may have been used to provide cover for the incomparably greater human tragedy in Croatia provoked by “Operation Storm”, which was unleashed with prior US knowledge and support.
The other curiosity in the chronology of these events is that the response of US political institutions, as reflected in the declassified Clinton Library documents, was oddly unsynchronized with the response of the Hague Tribunal to the identical set of events:
- On July 17, 1995, while at some locations executions were still in progress, ICTY Prosecution chief investigator Jean-Rene Ruez received marching orders to fly to Tuzla, Bosnia, to open an investigation into alleged mass murders of prisoners after the July 11 fall of Srebrenica. [Le Point (Paris), May 26, 2008]
- On July 20 Ruez arrived in Tuzla and began his assignment.
- On July 25, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia indicted Republika Srpska President Radovan Karadzic and Bosnian Serb Army commander Ratko Mladic for a variety of war crimes, including command responsibility for genocide in Srebrenica.
No information is available about the reports which prompted ICTY to launch so precipitously an official investigation into Srebrenica. Ruez’s report to his superiors of the findings he made in Tuzla, which should have been momentous to prompt genocide indictments in such short order, has not been made public either and nothing is known about the evidence that he claims to have uncovered. Does it appear credible that a judicial institution, the Hague Tribunal, had more ample sources of information than the American and other Western governments, with their experienced intelligence services and technological surveillance facilities at their disposal? On July 25, 1995, is it conceivable that the US authorities should have had only one witness to mass killings in Srebrenica, and not a particularly trustworthy one as it soon turned out, while — and this is what we are asked to believe — by the same date the Hague Tribunal with its comparatively scanty resources already must have had a dossier with sufficient evidence to designate the crime and indict the culprits?
These are serious incoherences. Combined with the seemingly result driven nature of the process on both tracks (diverting attention from the Croatian military operation in Krajina on the political level, and the acquisition of a hugely important new controversy to be adjudicated by the Tribunal on the legal level) these incoherences call into question much of what conventional wisdom has heretofore told us about Srebrenica.
APPENDIX
There are many more released documents where one would expect to see some evidence that a major slaughter had been detected in the vicinity of Srebrenica after the enclave’s fall on July 11, 1995. There were no such references, however, in official papers contemporaneous with the the alleged genocide. That seems manifestly inconsistent with Ambassador Madeleine Albright’s explicit claim to the UN on August 10, 1995, that aerial surveillance had reliably documented widespread killing on the ground:
Bosnia – London Conference, 7 21 95
A FOIA request for documents on “Srebrenica genocide” resulted in the declassification of a handful of items of minor significance, while most of the requested documents remained under seal for a variety of “national security” and other reasons:
FOIA 2006-0647-F – Genocide in the Former Yugoslavia
US diplomatic cables referencing the situation in Srebrenica and unresolved issues after July of 1995. Reference is made to grave human rights violations, but nothing rising to the level of genocide is alluded to. Note US Department of State cable on page 15, dated September 14, 1996 (sic, may be an error, context suggests 1995), where ICRC interviews with refugees in Tuzla are said to indicate “THAT 3,000 ARRESTED BY THE BOSNIAN SERBS IN SREBRENICA/POTOCARI ARE MISSING AND THAT ANOTHER 1,000 – 2,000 OF THOSE WHO FLED SREBRENICA ARE STILL UNACCOUNTED FOR”. Even two months later, there seems to have been no clear evidence of execution, hence the use of such terms as “missing” and “unaccounted for”:
Declassified Documents concerning Genocide in the former Yugoslavia
The following documents dated July 11 – August 14, 1995, refer to high level US Government meetings and discussions about the situation in Bosnia. There is no indication of awareness that crimes of exceptional nature or extraordinary magnitude were being committed:
1995-07-11, Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meetings on Bosnia July 11-12, 19951
1995-07-13A, BTF Memorandum re Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia July 14, 1995
1995-07-13B, BTF Report re Bosnia Alternative Courses of Action
1995-08-14A, Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meetings on Bosnia August 14, 1995
1995-07-15, Anthony Lake to President Clinton re Principals July 14 Conclusions on Bosnia
1995-07-18A, BTF Report re The Bosnian Army in Srebrenica What
1995-07-19, Anthony Lake to President Clinton re Bosnia Next Steps
1995-07-20A, NSC Paper re Bosnia Endgame Strategy
1995-07-21A, BTF Memorandum re Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia July 22, 1995
1995-07-25B, Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia July 25, 1995
1995-08-11, Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meetings on Bosnia August 11, 1995
1995-08-14A, Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meetings on Bosnia August 14, 1995