[The never implemented demilitarization of the UN protected zone in Srebrenica is a key component of the conditions which led to the dénouement of July of 1995. As shown in the text which follows, which is a chapter in the monograph of Srebrenica Historical Project entitled “Srebrenica: the deconstruction of a virtual genocide”, the failure of the United Nations to ensure the demilitarization of Srebrenica, as provided in the agreement which they had signed, made it possible for the Muslim side to continue its military activities and prepared the stage for the Serbian army operation in July of 1995, with tragic consequences. Just as it is unacceptable to discuss those consequences outside the context of systematic attacks on the surrounding Serbian villages and the mass killing of their inhabitants during the preceding three years, it is equally impermissible to ignore the issue of the mandated – but never implemented – demilitarization. That is one of the factors which facilitated the continuation of those pogroms, leading to the well known reaction in July of 1995]
The issue of demilitarization of the Srebrenica protected zone is essential to a proper assessment of UN’s and, in general, international community’s, liability. The failure to implement demilitarization in the Srebrenica enclave made the commission of crimes against the non-Muslim population in the region of Srebrenica possible after the UN protected zone was set up. It is, therefore, one of the key issues that define the liability of the defendants.
The general duty of the UN to intervene on behalf of unprotected non-combatants, not just Muslim but also Serbian and other non-Muslims, is established in any event based on the prevailing norms of international humanitarian law. In this particular case, that duty is especially pronounced because—in addition to general provisions—it is also based on specific obligations arising from formal demilitarization agreements to which the UN was a contracting party. The complete failure to implement the demilitarization process for Muslim armed forces in the protected Srebrenica enclave created the key material condition which allowed Muslim forces to continue to conduct their military operations. Those military operations resulted in the human casualties and material damage to which the Writ refers. The UN bears particular and chief responsibility for the failure to implement demilitarization.
Two demilitarization agreements were signed, with little of essence to distinguish them. The first agreement was signed by the warring parties and witnessed by an UNPROFOR representative on April 17, 1993; the second agreement which, in addition to Srebrenica, applied also to the nearby enclave of Žepa, was signed on May 8, 1993. On that occasion, the UN was represented personally by Gen. Morillon. [See Annex 1]
In the relevant portion of the April 17, 1993, demilitarization agreement, in par. 4, it is stated: “The demilitarization of Srebrenica will be complete within 72 hours of the arrival of an UNPROFOR company to Srebrenica (1100 hours 18 April 1993, if they arrive later this will be changed). All weapons, ammunition, mines, explosives, and combat supplies (except medicines) inside Srebrenica will be submitted/handed over to UNPROFOR under the supervision of three officers from each side with control being carried out by UNPROFOR. No armed persons or units except for UNPROFOR will remain within the city once the demilitarization process is complete. Responsibility for the demilitarization process remains with UNPROFOR.”
This provision is significant, inter alia, because according to it the UN, through its armed forces on the ground, expressly assume “responsibility” for the implementation of the demilitarization process.
The manner in which UN forces went about implementing their obligation is reflected in the UN Secretary-General’s report on Srebrenica in 1998:
“61. Approximately 170 UNPROFOR troops, principally from the Canadian contingent, deployed into the Srebrenica area on 18 April, establishing a substantial UNPROFOR presence there for the first time. The Canadian force then proceeded to oversee the demilitarization of the town of Srebrenica, though not of the surrounding area. Halilovic has stated that he ordered the Bosniacs in Srebrenica not to hand over any serviceable weapons or ammunition. The Bosniacs accordingly handed over approximately 300 weapons, a large number of which were non-serviceable; they also handed over a small number of heavy weapons, for which there was no significant amount of ammunition. A large number of light weapons were removed to areas outside the town.”[1]
It had become clear from the very start that the “demilitarization” of the protected zone was a game, and not an obligation that the Muslim side was seriously committed to fulfill. But clearly the UN also did not have any serious intention of insisting on it, as is made clear already in the following paragraph of UN Secretary-General’s document:
“62. The Secretariat informed the Force Commander that, in the light of the views of several Security Council members, he should not pursue the demilitarization process in Srebrenica with undue zeal, ruling out, for example, house-to-house searches for weapons. On 21 April UNPROFOR released a press statement entitled “Demilitarization of Srebrenica a success”.[2]
The April 21, 1993, UNPROFOR press release, presenting the collection of largely unserviceable weapons (and even that having been obtained without “undue zeal”) gives the whole game away. It was a deliberate sham.
The demilitarization agreement of May 8, 1993, whose range is expanded to cover the nearby enclave of Žepa, provides in par. 3 that all “military and para-military units must withdraw from the demilitarized zone or turn over their weapons”; that “UNPROFOR…will place the weapons and ammunition so collected under its supervision” [par. 4]; the position of UNPROFOR is defined so that it shall “control the demilitarized zone so as to facilitate the implementation of this agreement and UNPROFOR units of sufficient strength to control the demilitarized area shall remain in the demilitarized zone until the contracting parties should agree otherwise” [par. 5]; furthermore, no one “except for UNPROFOR personnel shall have the right to possess any weapons, munitions, or explosives. Weapons, munitions, and explosives in their possession shall be removed by UNPROFOR. Combatants shall not be allowed entry into the demilitarized zone” [par. 5]; finally, “at the beginning of the demilitarization process, UN civilian police shall oversee the maintenance of law and order within the demilitarized zone” [par. 7].
This new agreement, it may be supposed, was concluded at the insistence of the Serbian side, dissatisfied by the practical fiasco of the preceding one, signed on April 17, 1993. On that occasion, it will be recalled, UN officers in the field were advised from New York not to go too far in their efforts to find and seize Muslim arms. It contains several very interesting elements. First of all, “military and para-military” units within the enclaves are given a choice, either to turn over their weapons to the UN or to withdraw. In other words, this agreement announces a policy of Zero tolerance for the existence of any military formations in Srebrenica, except for those belonging to the UN. Furthermore, UN forces are charged with “controlling” the demilitarized zone “so as to facilitate the implementation of this agreement”, which logically includes the demilitarization provision, and that means in practical terms that after the weapons had been collected the UN will not allow any armed persons to enter the zone. Finally, “UN civilian police” assumes supervision over the maintenance of law and order in the demilitarized zone.
That can only mean that the UN shall be responsible for: [a] the security of citizens within the zone, and [b] that it will not permit any organizing within the zone for operations to be carried out beyond it that are contrary to the principles of law and order. This agreement, therefore, prohibits in the enclave of Srebrenica any planning or carrying out of attacks the goal or the consequence of which would be the killing of non-combatants in the surrounding communities.
As a result of the expansion of this agreement, relative to the preceding one, the supervisory role of the UN is defined here with greater clarity and that the UN is endowed with additional authority for the implementation of assigned goals. The personal presence of the commander of UN forces in Sarajevo, General Morillon, highlights the gravity of this agreement and the obligatory nature of the responsibilities assumed by the United Nations under it.
The correctness of these conclusions was confirmed by Gen. Morillon himself when he testified on February 12, 2004, before the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in the trial of Slobodan Milosevic: “The agreement provided that all those who were not ready to lay down their arms would have to leave the enclave…” [3]
It should be noted that the Dutch military authorities, whose battalion took over supervision of the enclave from the Canadians at the beginning of 1994, understood their mandate in a similar way:
„The most important aspect of this agreement was the demilitarization of Srebrenica and Žepa enclaves. It was intended that all military or paramilitary units would either withdraw from the demilitarized zone, or surrender all their arms and all ammunition, mines and explosives to UNPROFOR. Furthermore, UNPROFOR would now be authorized to confiscate arms and ammunition in the possession of civilians.“[4]
When criticized for not cooperating in the implementation of the demilitarization process, the Muslim side referred to alleged linguistic ambiguities in the Serbo-Croat translation of key terms, such as „safe zone.“ But regardless of subsequent linguistic debates concerning the precise meaning of the English phrase “safe zone,” and how best to render it into the Serbo-Croatian language,[5] it remains an undisputed fact that by its Resolution 824 of May 6, 1993, the UN Security Council did declare that Srebrenica “safe zone” was to be “demilitarized,” i.e. it accepted the concept that in return for cessation of military operations by the Serbian side all weapons and military equipment in the possession of Muslim armed forces within the enclave should be collected and placed in UN custody. The word “safe”, or “bezbedan” in Serbo-Croatian, may be the subject of various interpretations, but the concept of “demilitarization” is crystal clear. In case of any doubts, paragraph 4 of the agreement of April 17, 1993, and paragraphs 3, 4, 5 and 7 of the agreement of May 8, 1993, put those doubts to rest.
How the “demilitarization” process was coming along can be followed in numerous reports that were submitted by the Srebrenica Muslim army command [initially known as 8th Tactical Group, and from October 24, 1994, as 28th Division] to their superiors in Tuzla and Sarajevo, and the responses received from there. For illustrative purposes, the following report of armed forces staff in Srebrenica [no. 35/93 of July 28, 1993] to the 2nd Corps command of the Muslim army in Tuzla is highly indicative. The superior command is informed that in July of 1993, which means at a time when the “safe” and “demilitarized” zone was fully operational, the Srebrenica Operational Group had the following resources:
- Potočari brigade, three battalions,
- Sućeska brigade, three battalions,
- Kragljivoda brigade, three battalions,
- Five independent battalions and autonomous units.
Also, by order of the Srebrenica civil authorities, no. 124/92, of December 8, 1993, unit commanders were appointed. How is it possible that the existence of such significant and regularly organized military units could escape the attention of the UN contingent which was deployed in the safe zone precisely to make sure that something like that did not happen?
The conditions of the demilitarization agreement were clear and they were formulated on a quid pro quo basis: the Muslim side agrees to demilitarize and renounces further attacks on the surrounding Serbian villages and killing of their civilian inhabitants while the Serbian side, in return, renounces offensive operations against the enclave. That bargain was advantageous for the Muslim side because, in the assessment of the UN Secretary General in 1998, there was no doubt that in April of 1993, when the Serbian advance was halted by the agreement:
“While the Security Council was speaking out strongly against the actions of the Bosnian Serbs, UNPROFOR was confronted with the reality that the Serbs were in a position of complete military dominance around Srebrenica, and that the town and its population were at risk.” [6]
It is an accepted principle in international law that when one side ceases to respect the terms that had been agreed to, the other side is also relieved of the obligation to observe provisions applying to it. That is the clear conclusion of the First Additional Protocol of the Geneva Convention (1977), par. 60, clause 7, which refers to Demilitarized Zones:
“7. If one of the Parties to the conflict commits a material breach of the provisions of paragraphs 3 or 6, the other Party shall be released from its obligations under the agreement conferring upon the zone the status of demilitarized zone. In such an eventuality, the zone loses its status but shall continue to enjoy the protection provided by the other provisions of this Protocol and the other rules of international law applicable in armed conflict.”[7]
Paragraphs 3 and 7 define the conditions which must be fulfilled for the status of a demilitarized zone to be recognized, with the protections which flow from it.
As time went by, if we review the available files of the Muslim command, it will become obvious that contrary to signed commitments, and in spite of the presence of UN forces in the enclave, first of the Canadian and then the Dutch battalion, the organizational complexity and battle readiness of the illegal Muslim forces were growing continuously.
On February 8, 1994, the Municipal National defense Secretariat in Srebrenica forwarded dispatch no. 03-2/94 to the District Defense Secretariat in Tuzla, i.e. to the seat of the 2nd Corps of BH Army, where it reports on the current state of preparedness in the enclave as of January 1994:
- Armed forces [Army and Interior ministry] consist of 5271 personnel;
- Labor obligation service, 1221 personnel;
- Civil defence, 939 personnel;
- Serving the needs of the armed forces: 28 motor vehicles and 174 horses;
- Unassigned: 3247 personnel, including wounded and invalids.
On February 12, 1994, the command of Operational Group Srebrenica forwarded to 2nd Corps command in Tuzla a “Report on personnel losses and replenishment in 8th OG units as of February 2, 1994”.[8]
According to this dispatch, 8th OG units were up to 98,8% of their planned manpower level, i.e. that out of 5193 personnel slots, 5133 were filled.
Second Corps command forwarded the following order to the command of 8th Srebrenica OG, no. 02/2-356-1, on February 12, 1994, entitled “Activities plan and measures for enhancing combat preparedness, Order”.
In the preamble to the Order, it is said: “Based on reports forwarded to the OG command in relation to combat preparedness and 2nd Corps plan for the correction of battle preparedness deficiencies within the 2nd Corps, and in order to raise the total battle preparedness of 2nd Corps, it is ordered:
….(1) unit reorganization to be completed as soon as practicable; …(6) all units to send in officer promotion nominations; …(10) personnel replenishment in units to be conducted through district and municipal secretariats up to mandated levels; (11) situation summaries and combat reporting to be conducted in accordance with the most recent order of the supreme command.”
The strength of the 28th Division is also discussed in a document which is chronologically very close to the fall of the enclave. That is the report on the Division’s June 1995 manpower resources which the local command in Srebrenica forwarded to the Defense Department in Sarajevo on July 5, 1995. In that report the personnel strength of the division is stated to be 5.037 men.[9]
A logical question arises: what unit reorganization and combat reporting could possibly be taking place here, when in that period and in that general area no military units of any sort were allowed, save for those of the United Nations, and least of all non-UN units equipped for carrying out combat operations? As if wanting to dramatize the farce of “demilitarization,” Srebrenica Muslim military commander Naser Orić, by dispatch no. 130-29-25/94 of June 4, 1994, informs 2nd Corps command [Office of recruitment and personnel affairs] as follows: “In relation to your Order, strictly confidential, no. 03/96-53 of March 14, 1994, we are forwarding to you information about personnel levels in OG units. The data are listed on the RP-1 form, with all changes indicated.”
According to this report, personnel levels for 8th OG were as follows on June 4, 1994: officers, 429; non-commissioned officers, 562; soldiers, 4535, for a total of 5526 military personnel in 8th OG Srebrenica.
It is important to note that the manpower levels of Srebrenica 8th OG were constantly increasing, by about 100 new personnel per month. On February 12, 1994, Srebrenica 8th OG units had a total of 5133 personnel; on March 9, 1994, there were 5254 personnel; and on June 4, 1994, there were 5526. This manpower increase was occurring at a time when Srebrenica enclave was allegedly “demilitarized” and it was taking place in the presence and full view of UN forces.
Considering that Muslim units were organized according to professional military standards, it may be assumed that they were not meant simply to remain in place and act as unarmed observers. Not only were those armed forces not asked in April or May of 1993 to turn their weapons and equipment over to the UN, as required by signed commitments, but they were constantly provided with new supplies of military equipment which were arriving by a variety of channels. By failing to react in order to interdict this weapons flow, and by not confiscating the weapons that were already there, the UN compromised seriously their obligations under the relevant agreements and they must be held liable to answer for the consequences.
An example is a request forwarded on July 26, 1994, by the Srebrenica command of Moslem forces to the member of Srebrenica war presidency in Sarajevo, Efendić Murat, and to the commander of 2nd Corps in Tuzla. It speaks eloquently of the scope of this supply pipeline and of the gravity of the Defendants’ failure to fulfill their solemnly undertaken commitments:
“With reference to the conversation with the member of Srebrenica municipality war presidency on July 21, 1994, we forward to you a list of indispensable materiel and technical supplies and ask you to procure them and have them delivered to the free territory of the municipality of Srebrenica:
- Guns, sub-machineguns, and machineguns 4000 pieces
- Ammunition for the above weapons
- mortars 60 mm 60 pieces
- mortars 82 mm 36 pieces
- recoilless cannon 82 mm 20 pieces
- Ammunition suitable for the above weapons
- Artillery pieces: howitzers, MB 120 mm and others in similar quantities
- Ammunition for existing weapons:
– Bullet 7,62 mm for AP, PAP and PM 500,000 pieces
– Bullet 7,9 mm for P and PM 300,000 pieces
– Bullet 7,62mm for machinegun M-84 1,000,000 pieces
– Bullet 9 mm long 5000 pieces
– Bullet 12,7 mm for PAM 100,000 pieces
– Bullet 20 mm for Pat 20/3 1,000,000 pieces
– Bullet for Pat 20/4 1,000,000 pieces
– Mines for MB 60 mm 10,000 pieces
– Mines for MB 82 mm 10,000 pieces
– Projectile 76 mm for cannon B-1 3,000 pieces
– RBR “Wasp” [Zolja] 5,000 pieces
– RBR “OSA” with filling 100 pieces
– Hand held mortar 100 pieces
– Mine for RB 1000 pieces
We request that you procure the listed supplies, that you see to it that they are delivered to the free territory of Srebrenica municipality, and that you keep us informed of it.
Until final victory,
Commander,
Orić Naser”
The same commander, Naser Orić, forwarded on November 3, 1994, the following report, no. 01/130-204, to the chief of staff of the BH [Moslem] Army, Gen. Hadžihasanović:
“Reference: your letter no. 02-1/1347-1
In relation to your letter no. 02-1/1347-1 of November 1, 1994, we inform you that we also are working intensely on preparations for the forthcoming operation. Earlier, we communicated to you our proposals as to how to execute the task…To facilitate execution and in order to familiarize you with our resources, I have authorized and I have decided to send to you again Suljic Kasim who will orally and in detail inform you of our resources and intentions.“
What conceivable „tasks“ could have been planned by a military unit that formally did not even have the right to exist, much less to dispose of material resources necessary for the execution of military tasks? Against whom were those „tasks“ being planned while UN forces, which were in place to exercise control over the enclave and to guarantee its demilitarization, were looking in another direction?
Perhaps UN forces were looking the other way while activities incompatible with their mission in Srebrenica were going on. But, as is clear from the Dutch army Debriefing, published post factum in October of 1995, that does not mean at all that they were unaware of what was going on. All that means is that they did not choose to do anything about it.
According to the Debriefing, there is no dilemma as to the principal military task of the UN contingent, and it is defined with adequate precision:
„The military task was to maintain the status quo: as a result of the UN presence, the BSA [Bosnian Serb Army] was to be deterred from launching an offensive on the enclave, and the BIH [Bosnian Muslim] was to respect the demilitarized status of the enclave.“[10]
We learn, however, that in the performance of their task Dutch military personnel were facing an obstacle:
„A problem for the Dutchbat personnel in this respect was that if during patrols they came across armed BIH personnel or civilians, they were not authorized to use force in disarming them, nor were they authorized to enter homes without consent.“[11]
We learn further from the Dutch Debriefing that, as a result of that tolerant attitude, „the BIH forces carried out systematic actions from within the enclave, and subsequently withdrew to UN protected territory.“[12]The BIH forces in question were „organized into four brigades with a combined strength of 3000 to 4000 men.“[13]As for the Bosnian Serb forces on the outside, the conclusion of the Dutch Debriefing is that „operations of the BSA troops around the enclave were geared to maintaining the status quo and protecting the Bosnian Serb population in the enclave from offensives by BIH from within the enclave.“[14]
The Serbian side made no attempts to conceal its dissatisfaction in the face of that situation: „…the BSA regularly accused Dutchbat of failing to prevent the BIH’s military actions undertaken from within the enclave. However, because of its size Dutchbat was not at all able to prevent such actions, apart from urging the local BIH leaders to desist.“[15]
Serbian reactions to such provocative behavior of Muslims from within the enclave were getting more strident: „…at the end of April [1995] the BSA – in response to incessant sorties by the BIH – went so far as to hermetically seal the enclave, as a result of which it was impossible to provide supplies.“[16] One such incident, when during an attack from within the enclave seven Serbs were killed, caused a „fierce“ reaction from the Serbian side.[17]
The facts that were known to the Dutch military authorities on the ground were also familiar to the political leadership of the United Nations in New York. In a report on the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina published on May 30, 1995, referred to those matters in language that was couched in diplomatic phraseology, but still very clear:
„The party defending a safe area must comply with certain obligations if it is to achieve the primary objective of the safe area regime, that is, the protection of the civilian population. Unprovoked attacks launched from safe areas are inconsistent with the whole concept. In recent months, (Bosnian) government forces have considerably increased their military activity in and around most safe areas, and many of them, including Sarajevo, Tuzla and Bihac, have been incorporated into the broader military campaigns of the government side. The headquarters and logistic installations of the Fifth Corps of the government army are located in the town of Bihac and those of the Second Corps in the town of Tuzla. The Government also maintains a substantial number of troops in Srebrenica (in this case, a violation of a demilitarization agreement), Gorazde and Žepa, while Sarajevo is the location of the General Command of the government army and other military installations.“[18]
Numerous reports and orders illustrate the complete contempt of the Muslim leadership in Srebrenica for the control regime which should have been established in Srebrenica if the commitments discussed in paragraphs 2—8 of this section had been carried out, as well as the impunity with which they were violating that control regime.
In this regard, it is significant to consider the regular “Report for the month of October 1994 on the state of combat morale” which was forwarded to the 2nd Corps command by 8th OG Srebrenica assistant to the commander for morale, Nijaz Mašić, on November 7, 1994, no. 13-28-169/94.
It is said there that “there is an intense desire among the soldiers of 8th OG to take part in combat activity to liberate the area which separates the free territory of Srebrenica from the free territory of the district of Tuzla. Reconnaissance activities against the enemy have been conducted for that purpose. Personnel have been selected for combat and the necessary psychological and physical preparations have been made.” The clear reference here is to planned combat operations beyond the limits of Srebrenica enclave. That means that such operations were to be directed against nearby Serbian controlled territory, targeting its inhabitants.
But there is one more conclusion which follows from this and it aggravates the Defendants’ liability in this case: it turns out that Muslim forces in Srebrenica had a place and role in the strategic planning of the supreme command of the BH Army. The documents referred to suggest that those combat activities were being planned and carried out without regard for the UN or the Dutch battalion, and without any apparent hindrance from them, although their mission was precisely to prevent such things from happening. Regardless of the motive—negligence on the part of the Defendants or tacit strategic collaboration with one party in the conflict against the other—the same conclusion follows: the Defendants are liable for the consequences of their inaction. In this specific situation, that inaction comes down to passively permitting the Muslim side to mortally endanger innocent Serbian non-combatants in the vicinity of Srebrenica, who stood in the way of the execution of those „combat operations.“
In his book “Planned chaos,” [19] Ibro Mustafić, local Muslim municipal functionary in Srebrenica both before and during the conflict, offers additional information on this subject and by his eyewitness evidence corroborates the conclusion that the Defendants took no steps to disarm Muslim forces in the enclave or to implement the agreed upon demilitarization. Thus, on p. 342 of his book Mustafić says that it was precisely around the time of the Dutch battalion’s arrival that the Muslim army in Srebrenica began more visibly to acquire the characteristics of a serious and well organized military formation. Further, on p. 346, Mustafić mentions what he thought was a strange digging of embankments in mid-1995, something that should have been quite unnecessary in a demilitarized zone, but which he interpreted as preparation for imminent military operations. “Embankments were not being dug during the war,” Mustafić says, “and even trenches were a rarity, and now all of a sudden embankments were being dug to encircle the entire protected zone. What could have been the meaning of that? Young and old were required to lend a hand in the digging. It is interesting that this did not bother the Dutch at all. After coming up to our army’s lines and expressing disapproval, they turned increasingly tolerant, so that in the end they were just observing the digging of the embankments.” Mustafić interprets the Dutch soldiers’ passivity as follows: “Obviously, they were keen to rid themselves of some of the responsibility for the defense of Srebrenica and to shift it onto us.”
These activities, which were rather awkward for a “demilitarized zone,” and which, according to Mustafić, were proceeding under the observant eye of Dutchbat personnel, reached their point of culmination when “at more or less the same time…helicopters began to fly into Srebrenica. All those flights had Žepa as their ultimate destination, and some of our units would afterwards trek to Žepa and then to Srebrenica on foot and would return with a variety of cargo, uniforms, and arms” [p. 349].
It is plain that the activities reported by “insider” Mustafić who, as a Muslim and a member of Alija Izetbegović’s ruling party SDA, is in some sense testifying against interest and for that reason deserves greater credibility, cannot be reconciled with the concept of a demilitarized zone under the supervision and control of the United Nations.
The following conclusion would therefore appear to be reasonable: between April 18, 1993, until the end of June 1995, Srebrenica was not demilitarized; Muslim military units did not withdraw from it; Defendants not only failed to take away and place under custody weapons in possession of the Muslim forces, but over time they established a pattern of passivity in their conduct and assumed an attitude of indifference. That encouraged the Muslim side within the protected zone to reorganize their forces and to equip them for an even wider spectrum of combat activities and strategic assignments. The direct victims of such conduct of the Defendants were Serbian and other non-Muslim citizens who perished from the hand of armed and, due to the benevolence shown them by the Defendants, greatly emboldened Muslim forces.
In the Summer of 1995, the situation emanating from the UN protected Srebrenica enclave became intolerable in both strategic and humanitarian terms. In order to prevent a further humanitarian catastrophe from the standpoint of its obligation to protect the local Serbian population, the Bosnian Serb Army reacted with a military offensive. This is how the Dutch War Research Institute [NIOD Report, Part I, Chapter 10: Srebrenica under siege, p. 603] describes the conditions which led up to that:
“Throughout the remainder of 1992 the Serbs remained on the defensive in this region. Overall, Muslim fighters from Srebrenica attacked 79 Serbian places in the districts of Srebrenica and Bratunac. They followed a certain pattern. Initially, Serbs were driven out of ethnically mixed towns. Then Serbian hamlets surrounded by Muslim towns were attacked and finally the remaining Serbian settlements were overrun. The residents were murdered, their homes were plundered and burnt down or blown up. There was a preference to launch these attacks on Serbian public holidays (those of Saint George, Saint Vitus and the Blessed Peter, and Christmas Day), probably because least resistance was expected. Yet it simultaneously contributed to the development of profound Serbian grievances. Many of these attacks were bloody in nature. For example, the victims had their throats slit, they were assaulted with pitchforks or they were set on fire.
“It is estimated that between 1,000 and 1,200 Serbs died in these attacks, while about 3,000 of them were wounded. Ultimately, of the original 9,390 Serbian inhabitants of the Srebrenica district, only 860 remained, mainly in the four villages of Skelani, Crvica, Petrica and Lijesce. Serbian attempts to defend other villages met with little success. The Serbs in the district of Bratunac were largely driven back to the town of the same name. Faced with a constant shortage of troops, the authorities of the Republika Srpska (Serb Republic) showed little interest in defending the area.” [20]
Instead of offering their services as honest brokers and peacekeepers, the UN and, by extension, the intentional community, disingenuously chastised one side, while perfidiously overlooking and rationalizing the crimes of the other.
UNPROFOR correspondence, concretely between Brigadier Ridderstad and Muslim commanders Naser Orić and Rasim Delić, offers incontrovertible evidence that Dutch military authorities, and thus necessarily the UN of which they were an integral part, were well aware that Srebrenica protected zone was not demilitarized, as the agreements had required. Two messages that are very indicative in this regard will be quoted.
In a letter directed to Orić on February 1, 1995, and which may be viewed in its entirety in Annex-2, Ridderstad says:
“I should add that the subject of the enclave is always at the top of my priority list. We are fully aware that the demilitarization of the area has not been realized.”[21]
In his letter to Rasim Delić, also in Annex-2, chief of the general staff of the Moslem BH Army, Ridderstad addresses him as follows: [22]
For some inexplicable reason, the Dutch general uses rather subdued tones in his correspondence with Delić. He implores Delić rather humbly for the liberation of his soldiers, and merely warns his Moslem addressee of the penalty of bad publicity that the Moslem side might possibly suffer should it persist in its insolence:
“You will be well aware of the background. Srebrenica was declared a Safe area by UN Security Council Resolution 819 of 16 April 1993. The UN initiative to develop Srebrenica enclave as a UN ‘Safe Area’ has been thwarted. The articles of the ‘Agreement on the Demilitarization of Srebrenica’ dated 8 May 1993 have never been fulfilled by either of the warring parties. Military activity and ceasefire violations by both the BSA [Bosnian Serb Army], externally, and the BIH [Bosnian Muslim Army], internally, continue unabated; even with a Cessation of Hostilities Agreement in force. UNPROFOR is subjected continually to restrictions of movement, threats, intimidation by firing close, and actual attack. The civilian population inside the Enclave is suffering great hardship. Since the signature of the Demilitarization Agreement of 8 May 1993 both parties have steadfastly refused to cooperate with UNPROFOR forces, all this despite the best endeavours of UNPROFOR.”
Based on this correspondence, we may draw several significant conclusions:
- That UN forces and their highest representatives, in this case the Dutch General Ridderstad, were fully cognizant of the fact that a Moslem army was in existence in Srebrenica and that it had the official designation of 8th Operational Group, and that they did not react in any way whatsoever in relation to that fact, although it was unacceptable according to relevant agreements;
- That they also failed to undertake effective steps to see to it that the demilitarization agreement was carried out. By that failure, deliberately or not, they had not exposed just the surrounding Serbian population to marauding attacks, but—as evidenced by the theme of the letters—they had made possible for their own soldiers’ in Srebrenica to be taken hostage by the Moslems. That is precisely the subject of the letter to Delić, where Ridderstad complains that forces under Orić’s command in “demilitarized” Srebrenica had taken captive ninety-nine soldiers of the Dutch battalion; and
- Regardless of the evident tensions, the personal and almost friendly tone of General Ridderstad’s letters to Orić and Delić, especially to Orić, is astonishing. In view of the circumstances which caused those letters to be written, it borders on the absurd.
It is necessary here to pose the following logical question: if the UN general reacted so diffidently to the illegal blockade of his own troops, whom he had an absolute duty to protect by any and all available means, what could be expected from the Dutch military unit, or from UN forces in general, in relation to the fulfillment of their duties toward others, to be specific, their duty to protect the Serbian population in and around Srebrenica?
The untenability and perniciousness of that approach by the political authorities of the UN, as well as other leading countries which during the BH war had pretended to act as the “international community,” was noticed by General Satish Nambiar, who commanded UNPROFOR forces at the very beginning of the conflict:
“Portraying the Serbs as evil and everybody else as good was not only counter-productive but also dishonest. According to my experience, all sides were guilty but only the Serbs would admit that they were no angels, while the others would insist that they were. With 28.000 forces under me and with constant contacts with UNHCR and the International Red Cross officials, we did not witness any genocide beyond killings and massacres on all sides that are typical of such conflict conditions”[23]
It should be stressed here that General Nambiar was but the first from a long line of UNPROFOR commanders who drew upon their experiences in the field to eventually form an objective picture of the parties in the conflict. Quite a few among them, such as General Michael Rose, General Lewis MacKenzie, and even General Philippe Morillon himself, would take up their duties plainly under the influence of the virtually monolithic anti-Serbian political and media campaign which marked the prelude and the entire period of duration of the war, only to yield later to the irresistible effects of empirical evidence and to gradually move toward a more objective standpoint. That was probably the main reason why their political superiors kept replacing them, one after another, as unsuitable.
General Philippe Morillon, who commanded UNPROFOR in the critical period in 1993 when the protected zone was established, is a typical example of this sort of ambivalence.[24] He understood quite well the real character of the Muslim commander in Srebrenica, Naser Orić, and he had no illusions about Orić’s capacity to commit the most gruesome atrocities:
“I think you will find this in other testimony, not just mine. Naser Orić was a warlord who reigned by terror in his area and over the population itself. I think that he realized that those were the rules of this horrific war, that he could not allow himself to take prisoners. According to my recollection, he didn’t even look for an excuse. It was simply a statement: One can’t be bothered with prisoners.”[25]
“I wasn’t surprised when the Serbs took me to a village to show me the evacuation of the bodies of the inhabitants that had been thrown into a hole, a village close to Bratunac. And this made me understand the degree to which this infernal situation of blood and vengeance… led to a situation when I personally feared that the worst would happen if the Serbs of Bosnia managed to enter the enclaves and Srebrenica.”[26]
In the opinion of General Morillon, whose competence as an observer is beyond doubt, the atrocities committed by Srebrenica Muslim forces under the command of Naser Orić were precisely the factor which—on the regional level at least—activated the cycle of insatiable hatred which culminated in July of 1995 with the tragic massacre of Muslim prisoners:
“I feared that the Serbs, the local Serbs, the Serbs of Bratunac, these militiamen, they wanted to take their revenge for everything that they attributed to Naser Orić. It wasn’t just Naser Orić that they wanted to… take their revenge on, they wanted to avenge their dead on Orthodox Christmas. They were in this hellish circle of revenge. It was more than revenge that animated them all. Not only the men. The women, the entire population was imbued with this … [I]t was pure hatred…[S]uch hatred cannot be worse than it is towards neighbors and brothers.”[27]
Asked by Judge Robinson whether he thought that the massacre of Muslim prisoners in July of 1995 was in direct reaction to what Naser Orić was doing to the Serbs during the preceding years, General Morillon responded:
“Yes, Your Honour. I am convinced of that. This doesn’t mean to pardon or diminish the responsibility of the people who committed that crime, but I am convinced of that, yes.”[28]
While testifying before the Hague tribunal, Morillon confirmed his response on another occasion to Pierre Brane, a member of the French parliament, about the causes of the Srebrenica massacre in 1995:
“Accumulated hatred. There were heads that rolled. There were terrible massacres committed by the forces of Naser Orić in all the surrounding villages. And when I went to Bratunac at the time when I intervened, I felt that.”[29]
Morillon continues that in personal contacts Orić had admitted to him that he was killing Serbs[30], rationalizing it as “the rules of the game because in this sort of guerrilla warfare no prisoners are taken.”[31]
Asked whether he could confirm the view that was attributed to him in paragraph 3 of his statement to the International Tribunal at the Hague, that “it appeared that [Orić] was implementing political instructions which he was receiving from the Presidency”,[32] Morillon did so without hesitation:
“Yes… Naser Orić obeyed. He was head of a band. He was waging guerrilla war in the enclave, but he himself considered himself to be a combatant in the service of the Presidency.”[33]
Here, it would be useful to clarify what kind of “Presidency” that was whose directives, according to General Morillon’s information. Naser Orić and Muslim armed forces in Srebrenica were implementing in the field in the manner which General Morillon was describing. That was the Sarajevo “government” of Alija Izetbegovic which at that time enjoyed international recognition regardless of the bloody hands of its field representatives. General Morillon was obligated by the nature of his position to have official dealings with that group. For the duration of the war, the Defendants and their international sponsors maintained with it relations which were mostly cordial, but never less than correct.
If another blood curdling example is needed of the style of “guerrilla warfare” which Naser Orić and his forces applied when raiding Serbian villages around Srebrenica, the following will surely suffice.
In an article he published in Washington Post on February 16, 1994, correspondent John Pomfret conveys the following impressions from a séance with the local Srebrenica “warlord,” Naser Orić:
“Nasir Orić’s war trophies don’t line the wall of his comfortable apartment– one of the few with electricity in this besieged Muslim enclave stuck in the forbidding mountains of eastern Bosnia. They’re on a videocassette tape: burned Serb houses and headless Serb men, their bodies crumpled in a pathetic heap.
“We had to use cold weapons that night,” Orić explains as scenes of dead men sliced by knives roll over his 21-inch Sony. “This is the house of a Serb named Ratso,” he offers as the camera cuts to a burned-out ruin. “He killed two of my men, so we torched it. Tough luck.”[34]
On the occasion of this visit, Pomfret was accompanied by the correspondent for the Canadian Toronto Star, Bill Schiller, whose report rather picturesquely supplements the impressions of his American colleague:
“Orić is a fearsome man, and proud of it. I met him in January, 1994, in his own home in Serb-surrounded Srebrenica. On a cold and snowy night, I sat in his living room watching a shocking video version of what might have been called Nasir Orić’s Greatest Hits. There were burning houses, dead bodies, severed heads, and people fleeing. Orić grinned throughout, admiring his handiwork.
“We ambushed them,” he said when a number of dead Serbs appeared on the screen. The next sequence of dead bodies had been done in by explosives: “We launched those guys to the moon,” he boasted. When footage of a bullet-marked ghost town appeared without any visible bodies, Orić hastened to announce: “We killed 114 Serbs there. “Later there were celebrations, with singers with wobbly voices chanting his praises.”[35]
These observations are very troubling for the UN, and the „international community“ in whose name the UN acted in Bosnia and Herzegovina, because they leave them with no coherent answer to the question why, contrary to their express obligations, and after the establishment of the safe zone, they left weapons deliberately in the hands of Muslim forces in Srebrenica, although they were in a position to know that this would leave intact Muslim forces’ war making ability and would therefore lead to the continuation of their unspeakable atrocities. Based on these reports alone it is clear that they knew, or—which is the same thing—had the facilities to find out, the gravity of the consequences of their conduct.
The facts outlined above were so flagrant that the possibility that the UN and the „international community“ were unaware of them at the time of their occurrence can safely be excluded. The NIOD Report [published by the Dutch Institute for War Research] presents an excellent summary of conditions in the UN “protected zone” in Srebrenica and reveals the real purpose that zone actually served:
“…the [Srebrenica] enclave increasingly acquired the status of a ‘protected area’ for the ABiH, from which the ABiH could carry out hit and run operations against, often civilian, targets. These operations probably contributed to the fact that at the end of June the VRS was prepared to take no more, after which they decided to intervene: the VRS decided shortly after to capture the enclave. In this respect, the [illegal US sponsored] Black Flights to Tuzla and the sustained arms supplies to the ABiH in the eastern enclaves did perhaps contribute to the ultimate decision to attack the enclave. In this connection it is not surprising that Mladic and other Bosnian Serbs constantly complained about this, but usually received no response to their complaints…”[36]
Endnotes:
[1] http://www.un.org/News/ossg/srebrenica.pdf
[2] Ibid.
[3] Page 32045, lines 22-24.
[4] Report based on the Debriefing on Srebrenica [Rapporteur O. van der Wind, brigadier general], October 4, 1995, par. 2.20, p. 8 [See Annex-4]
[5] Translation difficulties are discussed by analyst Chuck Sudetic in his book “Blood and Revenge,” p. 290.
[6] http://www.un.org/News/ossg/srebrenica.pdf
[7] http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/7c4d08d9b287a42141256739003e636b/f6c8b9fee14a77fdc125641e0052b079
[8] Dispatch of 8th OG Srebrenica command, 42/94, of February 12, 1994
[9] ICTY archival designation: 1D26-0121,[see Annex-3]
[10] Debriefing, par. 2.30, p. 12
[11] Debriefing, par. 2.38, p. 13
[12] Debriefing, par. 2.34, p. 12-13
[13]Debriefing, ibid.
[14] Debriefing, par. 2.35, p. 13
[15] Debriefing, par. 2.43, p. 14
[16] Debriefing, par. 2.43, p. 14
[17] Debriefing, par. 2.46, p.
[18] Bosnia-Herzegovina report of the secretary-general pursuant to security council resolutions 982 (1995) and 987 (1995), May 30, 1995, par. 36, 38.
[19] Ibro Mustafić: Planirani Haos [Sarajevo, 2008]
[20]NIOD Report, Part I, Chapter 10: Srebrenica under siege, p. 603
[21] ICTY document, EDS no. 01837510.
[22]ICTY document, EDS no. 01837512
[23]Testimony of General Morillon, Prosecutor v. Milošević, 12 February 2004, p. 32042, lines 11-18.
[24] It is worth noting that Morillon’s theatrical media performance in Srebrenica in the Spring of 1993 was the trigger for the political process which in April of that year culminated in the UN Security Council resolution by which Srebrenica protected zone was established.
[25]Ibid., p. 31966, lines 5-10.
[26]Ibid., p. 31966, lines 12-19.
[27]Ibid., p. 31975, linesi 8-18.
[28]Ibid., p. 31975, lines 22-25.
[29]Ibid., p. 32031-2, lines 22-1.
[30]Ibid., p. 32044, lines 5-9.
[31]Ibid., p. 32044, lines 17-20.
[32]Ibid., p. 32044, lines 23-24.
[33]Ibid., p. 32045, lines 1-4.
[34]John Pomfret, Washington Post, 12 February 1994.
[35]Bill Schiller, Toronto Star, 16 July 1995.
[36]Srebrenica – A Safe Area? Appendix II – Intelligence and the war in Bosnia 1992 – 1995: The role of the intelligence and security services, Chapter 4, Secret arms supplies and other covert actions