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ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
 COMMAND OF THE 2ND CORPS
 MILITARY SECURITY SERVICE DEPARTMENT

No: _____/95

Tuzla, 11 August 1995

In the presence of authorised officials and in connection with developments in Srebrenica since the outbreak of war, I, **Ramiz BEĆIROVIĆ**, son of Osman and Fata, neé Suljić, born 11 June 1956 in the village of Opetci, Srebrenica Municipality, married, father of two children, administrative affairs attorney by profession, before the war employed in the Municipal Staff of the Srebrenica Territorial Defence and residing in Srebrenica, Maršala Tita St., apartment building no. 7, a member of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina since 15 April 1992, major by rank, position per establishment Chief of Staff of the 25th Division of the Land Army, temporarily residing in Tuzla at Skojevska St. no. 55, hereby give the following

STATEMENT

In mid-April 1992 a delegation consisting of Dr. Sabit BEGIĆ, Deputy Commander of the Police, Alija HASIĆ and, I think, Čazim SALIMOVIĆ took part in negotiations with the Chetniks in Bratunac. On that occasion the Chetniks set an ultimatum that weapons from Srebrenica be surrendered. I was a member of the National Defence Staff, and the tenants of my building informed me that some Serbs had brought weapons into the building. I barely managed to organise a search and on that occasion some weapons were found, and those people were brought in to be questioned. However, at the time I had a conflict with ZEKIĆ and Hamed SALIHOVIĆ regarding the matter, since I objected to the fact that these men had been released. At the time, it was said that the weapons were intended only for arming the Serbian police. My colleague on the staff, Suljo HASANOVIĆ, suggested that I join the Territorial Defence Staff which was only Muslim, since it had been formed by the SDA /Party of Democratic Action/. I accepted and was assigned to the position of Assistant Commander for Logistics. I was supposed to draw up an action plan relating to logistical security in the event of armed conflict. I sought certain information in this respect from Hamed EFENDIĆ, the president of the party, since it was said at the time that the party was distributing weapons, or quantities of weapons, sources of food and so forth, but that information was not accessible to me. I was even told that he did not engage in smuggling, so I was unable to obtain the information. Subsequently I asked the chief of the Public Security Station how much weaponry the Muslims had, but I was unable to obtain that information either. As a result, the staff did not really become operative.

Srebrenica was occupied, without putting up any resistance, on 17 April 1992. At the time, I was with my father in Sučeska. We received various information. We heard that Naser ORIĆ was putting up resistance, which significantly encouraged the people. Together with Zulfo TURSUNOVIĆ and Zulfo SALIHOVIĆ, I organised a defence line at the periphery of the village. I knew that Hakija MEHOLJIĆ was somewhere in the neighbouring forest together with his fighters, and we tried to get in touch with him and with ORIĆ. On 26 April 1992, Zulfo TURSUNOVIĆ and I came to Potočari and that was the first time I met Naser ORIĆ. We later met Hakija

MEHOLJIĆ and it was decided that we expand the resistance. I don't know who killed ZEKIĆ, but after that the Serbs were totally disoriented and fled the town, so the Muslims began to return. I know that at the time around 60 people were killed by the Chetniks in Srebrenica. They were mostly elderly people, and the bodies of a large number were burnt. Ramo KADRIĆ, who is now our driver in the Division Command, knows a lot more about the crimes the Chetniks committed during their occupation of Srebrenica, because he was captured. Hasib /? ŠPIODIĆ/ was in Srebrenica during the occupation and he was an eyewitness to some killings perpetrated by the Chetniks. Suljo MAŠIĆ, from Srebrenica, was also in the town, where he worked at the Elementary Education Centre, but I don't know whether the two of them reached liberated territory. Nijaz MAŠIĆ and N. ALIĆ worked on gathering information on the genocide in Bratunac and Srebrenica, but I don't know what happened to the documentation that they compiled. I know that /? the bodies of/ Redžep REDŽEPOVIĆ, the SALIMOVIĆ couple and the parents of Čazim SALIMOVIĆ were burnt in Srebrenica.

In the months of May, June and July, we managed to round off part of the liberated territory of Srebrenica and Bratunac. Throughout this period I was in Sučeska. When I was invited in September to work on the staff in Srebrenica, I accepted and I know that ties with Cerska and Konjević Polje had already been established at the time. Ferid HODŽIĆ was the commander in Cerska and Velid ŠABIĆ was the commander in Konjević Polje.

Nurif RIZVANOVIĆ came to Srebrenica, as far as I heard, in July 1992, but I didn't see him. A number of fighters who came with him remained in Srebrenica.

In May 1992 I proposed that a War Presidency be formed, because at the time there were no representatives of authority. Individuals who had placed themselves at the head of the armed resistance came into the leadership, while party representatives were very passive politically, so that this too was one of the reasons why the party was not engaged to a greater extent. The president of the party, EFENDIĆ, was very passive while the struggle was being waged. Hajrudin ABDIĆ, who was the President of the SDA Deputies' Club, came to head the War Presidency.

Hamed SALIHOVIĆ, Naser ORIĆ and Zulfo TURSUNOVIĆ went to Cerska for consultations in September 1992 and there it was agreed that unified armed forces would be established for this area. A /? subregion/ was formed, and a list of individuals who would become involved in political and military organs for these areas was established. I don't know whether anyone discussed the role of Nurif RIZVANOVIĆ. I had heard that Nurif RIZVANOVIĆ and his group were heading towards Srebrenica and that on the way he was ambushed. Since then, all signs of him had disappeared. It is a fact that I also heard the story that some of our people had killed him, but I didn't pursue the matter and I don't know what really transpired, because there was also a story circulating that he had attempted to escape and had been captured. However, since I didn't know him personally, I knew nothing about him.

It was very difficult to organise joint logistical support, since every local community had its own logistics and fed its army. We tried to agree that when a Serbian village was liberated, the entire booty would be directed to joint warehouses and then be divided into equal parts. However, as soon as a village was liberated, the people would rush in and everyone took what he wanted. As a result, further attempts to establish joint logistics were abandoned.

The lists in the possession of the Serbs state that some of our people took part in crimes against the Serbs. I have determined that those lists also include the names of individuals who were never members of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina and as such could not have participated in the crimes. Thus, for example, the lists include the name of an elderly teacher, I think her name is **Esma KIVLJEVIĆ**, who assuredly could not have possibly participated in perpetrating crimes. The list also includes the name of Rešid SINANOVIĆ, who I also know was never a member of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina. I saw that Chetnik list in the Chetnik newspapers which circulated in Srebrenica.

Problems existed in Srebrenica between the civilian and military police. No one knew what came under whose authority. As far as I can remember, the first killing in Srebrenica occurred at the beginning of the war in 1992. I think that individuals from the village of Pale were involved, who were engaged in a settling of accounts. I don't know whether the killer or the person killed was from the village of Pale. N. ŠEHIĆ was killed and I heard that he had been killed by a man who had also killed or attempted to kill someone before the war and had been tried, also before the war. ŠEHIĆ was in the company of a man named Kemo from the village of Pale who had a conflict with the killer – they had engaged in some fights earlier – and when they started shooting, ŠEHIĆ was killed instead of Kemo, who was supposed to die.

Emir HALILOVIĆ from Potočari killed ZEC and his mother and he was taken into custody, via UNPROFOR, and imprisoned in Tuzla. While he was in the hospital, he killed a Serbian prisoner.

During the *Padobran* /Parachute/ operation, there were a number of murders, but I don't know who was killed or who the killers were. At the time, everyone who was able to walk among the population went to search for food, so it was to all purposes impossible to keep up with who had been killed. At that time, the civilian police was already keeping an eye on these developments.

The last murder I know of was that of Hamed SALIHOVIĆ, who was the Chief of the Public Security Station before the war. Ibran MUSTAFIĆ, a deputy in the Assembly, was wounded, and he had been with Hamed EFENDIĆ, who was the President of the SDA before the war. This occurred in May 1995.

Following the arrival of UNPROFOR in Srebrenica and when the wartime situation calmed down, there were attempts to make the SDA more active in its work. This was where the polarisation within the party became clear. The president of the party was replaced and new members of the Executive Committee were elected. I am not a member of that party so I don't know everything that was going on. I do know that Ibran MUSTAFIĆ, Hamed SALIHOVIĆ, Hamed EFENDIĆ, Ahmo TIHIĆ and for a time MANDŽIĆ were on one side. Zulfo SALIHOVIĆ, Hajrudin AVDIĆ, Džemo BEČIROVIĆ, who was in charge of the economy and social affairs and others were members of the other side of the Executive Committee which was engaged in the conflict.

When I heard about the killing, I assumed that this would be attributed to the people in the ruling circle, especially since this occurred after my return from Tuzla, and there was even talk that Naser had prepared all this while we were in Tuzla. Hamed EFENDIĆ and Ibran MUSTAFIĆ said at the Assembly that they knew who had committed the killing and went so far as to say that the perpetrators were sitting in the Assembly hall, although I was not /handwritten/ present there. The civilian police attempted to get to the bottom of this murder and wounding. Rešid EFENDIĆ, about whom I heard that he had remained in Potočari, was working on this, as was the

Security Chief Nedžad BEKTIĆ. I was not informed about the results of the investigation, because I sustained injuries in a helicopter which /? was shot down/ and had to undergo treatment. I heard that a meeting had been held in the house in which Ahmo TIHIĆ lived, which was attended by Hamed EFENDIĆ, Hamed SALIHOVIĆ, Ibran MUSTAFIĆ and Ahmo TIHIĆ and it was said that Huso SALIHOVIĆ and Fahrudin ALIĆ, who had arrived in Tuzla, had also attended. As I later heard, the establishment of a separate army which would be under the command of the individuals referred to above was discussed at the meeting. Namely, I heard from a man who came from Potočari whose /name/ I can't remember now, that just before the meeting, Hamed SALIHOVIĆ played chess with some man in Potočari and made a remark on that occasion to the effect that there was a tendency to create another army and that he was facing a dilemma since he didn't know what to do. As they returned from the meeting, they were fired upon and Hamed SALIHOVIĆ was killed, Ibran MUSTAFIĆ wounded while EFENDIĆ sustained no injuries.

As to relations between these two groups of SDA members, I think that a power struggle was going on, and that disinformation was spread by the group consisting of the former leadership, such as the information that the ruling circles were engaged in black marketeering with humanitarian aid, and people would pick up these rumours and elaborate on them. On several occasions the police tried to verify the accuracy of the reports on black market sales of goods that were in short supply. They confiscated items on the market several times and brought the black marketeers in for questioning, but they always said that these were goods that had been brought in from Žepa, and so the arrests yielded no results. With respect to the trafficking of goods with the Chetniks, two or three individuals from Dugo Polje whose names I don't know were taken into custody, but I do know that they were detained and that their goods were confiscated. On one occasion, Commander ORIĆ personally intervened on the firing line in Buljim, because it had already been reported that there would be trafficking in goods, and on that occasion three or four Chetniks were liquidated and the goods confiscated.

We had no information about the individuals who were possibly cooperating with the Chetniks, except for the fact that occasionally they would shout out to each other across the lines, which we forbade. I don't know of any individual who gave information to the Chetniks for money or in any other manner. It is certainly possibly that individuals who were captured gave information to the Chetniks.

In 1994, three girls, on which one was from Šubin, the other from Dimnić and the third I don't know, went on their own initiative over to the Serbian side and returned after some twenty days. On their return, Nedžad BEKTIĆ, the Division's assistant commander for security, talked to them, but I don't know what the outcome was. As they related it, they left because they had been badly treated and did not have food. They were prostitutes and it was said about them that in Žepa they had contacts with the Ukrainian members of UNPROFOR and with the Serbs. In Žepa they were arrested and transferred to Srebrenica. During the time they spent on the Serbian side, they appeared on television, subsequently explaining to us that they were forced to make a statement on television. We did not succeed in getting any information out of them about their cooperation with the Chetniks.

Once UNPROFOR arrived, a Serb, Dana SMAJLOVIĆ, who cohabited with Nazif KRDŽIĆ or with Atif, a former policeman and then a member of the brigade command and now arrived here on liberated territory and was often in contact with UNPROFOR members, without any control, so it is possible that she gave away a lot

of information. The way I heard it, she set out together with KRDŽIĆ with a column of troops attempting a breakthrough and when that part of the column was attacked, she returned to Žepa and from Žepa came back to this area. She had contact with UNPROFOR members in her apartment or at their place, and when we objected we were told that UNPROFOR was required to check persons of different nationality and that this was the reason why they often paid her visits.

After we got those two agreements on the demilitarisation of Srebrenica, we had to disarm completely. We barely managed to secure some older weapons in disrepair to hand over to UNPROFOR while the troops hid the rest at their homes. It was a custom for the troops to keep their weapons at their homes and only exceptionally were they handed out to other troops at the line. It was never permitted to have weapons grouped in one place. Heavy weapons were surrendered to UNPROFOR. As far as I can recall the following was handed over: two T-55 tanks, a 105 mm howitzer, a B-1 76 mm gun, two 20/3 and 20/4 anti-aircraft guns, an armoured carrier which was in disrepair and which had two 82 mm recoilless guns, a small multiple rocket launcher which we captured from the Chetniks and which I think was removed from an aircraft, a 120 mm mortar and several 82 mm mortars which were for the most part incomplete without a gun-carriage and so forth. The members of the Canadian Battalion wanted to destroy the weapons but I did not allow that because that had not been set out in the agreement, but the conditions for guarding the weapons were very bad, so that that weapons have suffered considerable damage by now. On the occasion of our breakthrough, the heavy weapons remained, while we took infantry weapons with us. The ammunition for infantry weapons was immediately destroyed because UNPROFOR told us they had no technical conditions for safeguarding them, while other ammunition was damaged because of the poor conditions under which it was kept. We always had to have several troops on the line who had to hide because UNPROFOR would take them into custody and confiscate their weapons. When the Dutch came, they filmed our troops with cameras to prove to us that we had weapons, so we had problems proving that we had no weapons.

After we surrendered our weapons to UNPROFOR, we obtained some materiel and technical equipment in 1994 and 1995 which was smuggled through the defence lines and the zone of responsibility of the 2nd Corps. I was told by Kasim SULJIĆ, who is currently serving in the Division Command in Tuzla, that the transfer of materiel and technical equipment was carried out in cooperation with Hasan MURATOVIĆ, operative group commander at the time, and with the General Staff. As part of this organised transfer, we got some 20 *Zoljas* /hand-held rocket launchers/, a small quantity of hand-grenades and a small quantity of ammunition for 7.62 rifles. I heard that some 40 men carried the equipment in our direction, but we did not get everything. Part of the equipment was buried somewhere around Kamenica. The ammunition was buried, and as far as I know there were no communications equipment on that occasion or any other anti-tank weapons. Since Kasim was personally present when the supplies were received, he could know the details. I don't know if there were other cases of transferring materiel and technical equipment in this manner except for this one instance, because later, at our request, materiel and technical equipment was brought in by helicopter.

I know that the negotiations concerning the surrender of weaponry to UNPROFOR were conducted by a Corps delegation consisting of Enver MANDŽIĆ, Zaim ČIVIĆ, /? Džozad/ KELVEDIN and Franjo NIŠANOVIĆ and I think that Dr. Neoret MUJKANOVIC was present on one occasion. Another surgeon, Meho N., I

don't know his last name, was also present in this area. This delegation arrived in UNPROFOR helicopters, while Franjo NIŠANOVIĆ stayed with us two to three months because he stayed on until the next arrival of the delegation, which was prolonged to the period I mentioned, because the delegation did not come for a long time. Two foreign journalists also came to our area, of whom one came on foot with some of our troops. I also know that a man named Senad from the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina came. They were present during the *Padobran /Parachute/* operation. Except for these individuals, no one else came to the Srebrenica area since it was demilitarized.

We had a well fortified defence line, although the weakest line was along the axis towards Žepa, from Ljeljendo to Podravanje, to the south – south-east of Srebrenica.

In late April 1995 we flew by helicopter from Žepa and arrived in Zenica. We were part of a delegation sent from Srebrenica, headed by Commander Naser ORIĆ, and including Hajrudin AVDIĆ, who was appointed to the position of Deputy Minister, Esed NUKIĆ, Dževad TESKEREDŽIĆ, Senaid JAHIĆ and myself. They had the task of organising, in Tuzla, the work of Srebrenica Municipality, and so were supposed to stay on in Tuzla. Commander ORIĆ and I were supposed to go back together, but after a discussion with the commander of the General Staff, ORIĆ received permission to stay on in Tuzla for a while and to return to Srebrenica after the training of officers who had arrived earlier was completed. From Zenica, all the delegation members were transferred to Kakanj, while the disabled /veterans/ who came with us, were transferred elsewhere. In Kakanj we were received by the Chief of Staff, General HADŽIHASANOVIĆ, and talks were then conducted about developments in Srebrenica and the reasons for our arrival. We were supposed to be driven to Tuzla, in order to continue work with the Corps Command. In the meantime, the Commander of the General Staff, DELIĆ, arrived, who enabled us to go on to /? Višća/ by helicopter, and we were then transferred to the Corps Command, where Commander Sedo DELIĆ received us. Later we had a meeting with Governor Izet HADŽIĆ. On the second day, we visited the defence line in Kladanj, above the *Starić* tunnel, and the following day we toured the command of the Teočak Brigade, Sapna, Mededa and Snježnica. The next day we went to Kakanj. President IZETBEGOVIĆ came and we spoke to him, and the commander decided that Ramo ČARDAKOVIĆ, chief of staff of the Žepa brigade and I should leave for Sarajevo. We were required to go there to collect funds from the *Šehid /martyr/* fund and to take them to Srebrenica. We collected the money from the Fund which is located somewhere in the area behind the Ministry of the Interior building. I withdrew 150,000 German marks, while Mumo KLUČ and a group of officers who were undergoing training in Sarajevo collected the funds for Žepa. As far as I heard, we missed one another. In the National Bank, on order of the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, I collected 80,000 German marks, while Ramo collected money for Žepa, although I don't know the amount. When we collected the money from the Bank, the reason why the money was being withdrawn was not designated. Instead, I was just told that this was money for Srebrenica. We went to the bank with the representative of the Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Earlier we had prepared the papers to collect the money together with the Assistant Minister of Finance. I had an authorisation in writing from Commander ORIĆ to collect that money, since the Commander was informed of the matter before I set out for Sarajevo. We returned to Kakanj with the money. There the Commander

informed me that I was flying back with a group by helicopter. I stayed in Zenica, awaiting my return to Srebrenica. I had the entire amount of money from Sarajevo with me all the time, and I parted with none of the money but took it all with me to Srebrenica. Although in Sarajevo I had been informed that I was supposed to collect army money at the Kakanj Command, I did not do so. **Later I heard that Commander ORIĆ collected that money, but that it had been deposited since there was no way to transfer it to Srebrenica.**

On the afternoon of 5 May 1995 we flew from Kakanj to Srebrenica. I thought it strange that we had set out in daylight, since I expected we would be travelling at night. We arrived at /? Višča/, and then we were transferred to the *Energopetrol* building, to the command, where we stayed until 2400 hours when we were notified that we could not take off because of weather conditions. We were subsequently transferred to the *Husinska buna* barracks where we spent the night, and then we had the day off until 2000 hours. When we gathered at the barracks, some time around 2300 hours, we set out again for /? Višča/. There we stayed at a house where there was a /? public/ kitchen. We spent about 15 to 20 minutes there and then boarded the helicopter. There were 19 of us and three crew members. We were told that we would be flying around 23 minutes, of which ten minutes over Chetnik territory. We took off at 0200 hours on 7 May 1995 and in the area between Han Pijesak and Sokolac, the helicopter was suddenly lit up. I don't know if it was a grenade or a search light. I saw a winding road below and I felt the helicopter take a dive and tilt to the right. Then I saw that they were firing at us with tracer bullets from anti-aircraft defence weapons, but that was behind us, that is to say, at that point I did not notice that we had been hit. After that shelling of the helicopter commenced from all sides, and I had the feeling that we were then crossing the line. At the time I didn't notice that any of us had been hit, nor were there any traces that the helicopter had been hit, especially in view of the fact that there were no changes in the sound of the engines. I suddenly noticed that the firing had stopped and I thought we had crossed the line. I noticed that they had twice turned the beam lights off and on in the helicopter, and then they were turned on and stayed on. The colleague sitting across me, Ramo ČARDAKOVIĆ, told me then that we had arrived at Žepa and would be landing soon, and he got up. I waited for the helicopter to land, and did not get up from my seat, and since I was the first by the door no one could get out if I didn't get up first. I didn't notice whether the helicopter had hit something or any change whatsoever in the operation of the engines. I don't recall at all how the helicopter fell or hit the ground. I know that at one point I just regained consciousness. Something was pressing against my head which I succeeded in removing, even though to this day I don't know what it was. It was then that I realised that the helicopter had crashed. I called out to see if anyone had survived, but no one responded. I felt strong pain in the area of the pelvis. I tried to get up but couldn't. I lay down on my stomach, and by groping around found a rifle next to me. I tried to move forward. I heard people making a racket and I thought we were surrounded by Chetniks. I heard someone's voice calling out the name of Sifet, the captain, but I didn't dare answer. Subsequently, that same voice asked: "Ramo, are you alive?" I responded and then they transferred me to Žepa. In addition to myself, eight other people survived the accident. Mehmed MALIĆ and Muhamed MALIĆ came along with me; they were with me in the helicopter when the accident occurred. Others who came along with us included a child who had been with us, I don't know the first name SALIHOVIĆ, although I don't know its first name, as well as Numo KRLUĆ who is from Žepa, and

as far as the rest are concerned I don't know. As I heard it, after contacting the command in Tuzla, Dževad BRGULJA from Žepa removed some kind of a box from the helicopter which recorded everything related to the accident. I later heard that the helicopter had hit a beech and tumbled to the ground as a result, at a distance of some 50 to 100 metres from where it was supposed to land. Dževad BRGULJA was also a pilot, and he told me that he had been in contact with our pilot at the time when they were firing at us but that later he could not hear him. At that point when he was guiding him for touchdown, the helicopter all of a sudden abruptly veered to the left, hitting a beech, as a result of which it crashed. None of the crew members survived. I heard this personally from Dževad, because he took statements from all of us survivors. He thought it strange that the pilots turned on the helicopter lights three times and finally left them on. The doctors who examined the bodies said that there were no bullet traces of on them, and Dževad personally examined the helicopter debris and found no trace that it had been hit. Upon examining what was left of the helicopter, a leather bag was found in which I kept the money collected for the *Šehids* and Srebrenica in Sarajevo, amounting to 230,000 German marks. The money was handed over to me in the hospital, and I heard that the money Ramo had been carrying for Žepa had also been recovered, although I don't know what the amount was.

I spent about ten days in Žepa undergoing treatment, and later I was transferred to Srebrenica, which is where I took the money with me. Since we had no safe in the command, I kept the money with me in my flat. I ordered the commander of the local command, Hazim OSMANOVIĆ, to begin paying compensation to the families of fallen soldiers and *Bajram* compensation, because this was supposed to be covered by part of the 150,000 German marks which I had brought. He organised the compilation of lists and informed the units, and the cashiers came to my flat to collect the money, along with a receipt. I made somewhat larger payments than were cited on the list, because I always bore in mind that there could be some errors. I always obtained a receipt for the precise amount of funds paid out. Funds were paid out to all units except for the 280th Brigade and some families of fallen soldiers who did not belong to a specific unit. According to our account, around 1,300 to 1,400 families of fallen soldiers were to receive 50 German marks each, and the parents of the fallen victims were paid out *Bairam* gifts in the amount of 50 German marks. About 200 families were supposed to be paid 50 German marks each in the 280th Brigade, so that around 1,100 families were paid, although I don't know how many parents received this compensation. I think that the commander of the local command made those lists and he should have a more precise idea of how much was paid out. A specific amount of money which was left over after a series of three payments of compensation to the families of fallen soldiers remained in the flat of Commander ORIĆ, because we did not have a safe in the command. I don't know how much money remained from the series of the last three payments, and since I did not add the amounts which I paid out from the amount of money I had brought from Sarajevo, I don't know exactly how much I was supposed to pay on this basis. You could say that I paid out some 80,000 to 90,000 as assistance to /families of/ fallen soldiers from the 150,000 German marks fund. From this amount I also paid out money to those who had been granted the *zlatni ljiljan* /golden lily/, 500 German marks each, but I don't know how much money was paid out. Namely, in Tuzla, Commander ORIĆ collected money for the recipients of the *zlatni ljiljan*, and since some of those people were in Tuzla and some in Srebrenica, I was informed to pay the money out of the existing fund to those people who were in Srebrenica. Just precisely how much money was paid out for this

purpose can be determined with the assistance of Nijaz MAŠIĆ, Assistant Commander for Morale, who is currently assigned to the Division Command in Tuzla.

On my arrival in Srebrenica, Zulfo TURSUMOVIĆ, who was the representative of Commander ORIĆ, gave me 10,000 German marks. The money had been transported by helicopter while we were in Kakanj and Tuzla. The money was earmarked for supplementary food for those who were fasting. I distributed the money to no one. From the 80,000 German marks received from the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, around 10,000 German marks were spent to procure fuel and tyres for one car. This was procured through the black market, since one litre for fuel cost from eight to ten marks. The black marketeers obtained the fuel in Žepa. The fuel was taken by a commission, so I justified the expenditures by a receipt signed by the commission, while they justified it with the signatures of the individuals from whom they purchased the fuel.

Just before the aggression against Srebrenica took place, I had about 140,000 German marks with me in my flat. Ibrahim SMAJIĆ, Assistant Commander for Logistics, Alija ABDURAHMANOVIĆ, in charge of the depot, Hazim OSMANOVIĆ, commander of the local Command, Šukrija EFENDIĆ, who was in charge of housing in the local Command can be of assistance in determining the precise amount spent, and they all arrived on liberated territory. On leaving the town, I did not think about the funds because I didn't expect we would go to Tuzla. When I arrived in Tuzla, however, I asked my wife what had happened to the money. She told me she had taken the money with her, but that in Potočari, when she heard that the Chetniks would be searching the people, she buried the money in a sand-filled barrel in the accumulator factory at the UNPROFOR base where they had been put up, in the presence of Hatidža KRLUČ from Srebrenica, currently somewhere in the Tuzla area, and N. ZUKIĆ, the wife of Avdo from Potočari, currently somewhere in the Tuzla area. She suggested to the women that they split the money, but they were afraid to take it. My wife was extremely anxious that the Chetniks would find it and that's why she hid it. Some of the things she had taken along with her she either threw away or distributed to others.

I don't know how much money there was in Srebrenica at the moment when it was taken, but as far as I know, 300,000 German marks had been transferred to Srebrenica to be distributed in a series of three payments to the families of fallen soldiers. I know that a total of some 260,000 German marks were distributed, since there were around 1,300 to 1,400 families. The individuals I mentioned certainly know more about the payments. I don't know what happened to the remainder of the money in the possession of Commander ORIĆ, although I knew that he, too, kept money in his flat. When he had a large amount of money in the flat, he would assign two guards to his flat to watch over the money. When Commander ORIĆ set out with me for Tuzla, Abdulah MAJSTOROVIĆ, Assistant Commander for Legal Affairs, stayed on in the apartment. He has since arrived on liberated territory and works in the Division Command.

Since stories are circulating among the troops of the 28th Division that I brought around 140,000 German marks to liberated territory and that no one knows what happened to that money, I demand that an official investigation be launched to establish what happened to that money, since I do not want my name to be sullied. I know that my responsibility exists since I was entrusted with that money, but I demand that the troops of the 28th Division be informed of everything that the security organs of the 2nd Corps determine about the matter, because this is the only way to

put a stop to the stories. With this objective, I personally asked Colonel ŽILIĆ to launch an investigation into the matter.

Upon my arrival in Srebrenica, I assessed that the situation there had deteriorated significantly. The Chetniks used every rotation of UNPROFOR troops to move the line and enter ever more deeply into the safe area. When a new UNPROFOR unit would arrive, it would accept the status quo and they were not interested in what had happened before. And so it was this time. We noticed that Chetnik forces were massing on the borders of the safe area, and a replacement of the Dutch battalion was expected. The Chetniks demanded that UNPROFOR withdraw from its observation posts into the safe area. I was informed of this by the commander of the Dutch battalion, but he told me that they had rejected the Chetnik demand for withdrawal, and that they would seek the assistance of NATO forces. When the Chetniks attacked the UNPROFOR point at Jadar, they did, however, withdraw 400 to 500 metres. The UNPROFOR commander informed me that he had received an order from his superior command to withdraw from all observation posts. They had informed their own Government about this, and their Government had ordered them not to withdraw. As a result, the commander informed his superior command that he would not withdraw from all observation posts. **In that period we fortified our lines of defence.** We placed all brigades on a state of alert, including the Žepa 285th Brigade, to which we gave the special task of monitoring its own zone of responsibility. Since the 283rd Brigade did not have its zone of responsibility, we gave them part of the zone of the 282nd Brigade towards the Podravanje, from Sljivova and including /? Čavorka/. The 284th Mountain Brigade was partially assigned to the Kiporovo area, while the 282nd Brigade was assigned the area from Jasenova to the /? Čičovac/ stream. In this manner, the zone of responsibility of this Brigade was reduced by more than a half, since the assessment was that the attack would be launched from this area. We were of the opinion that this would be a limited attack to seize the road which the Chetniks could use for the needs of the mine. The Chetniks had two infantry attacks in the area of Bukova Glava (Javor) – Zeleni Jadar, and these attacks were repelled. Only provocations were attempted in other areas. **The Chetniks infiltrated a group into the Vidikovac settlement and the hospital area through the tunnel connecting Srebrenica with the Sase mines. This group opened fire on the settlement and after several minutes withdrew through the tunnel.** We knew the tunnel existed but thought it had been blocked, because that had been done in 1993. We didn't know, however, that the people had taken some pipes from the tunnel so that it was in effect clear. **The Command of the 2nd Corps and the General Staff issued an order that the enemy's attention be drawn by sabotage actions by carrying out reconnaissance of enemy forces in depth in order to help lift the blockade of Sarajevo.** I selected several groups which had the task of reconnoitring, ordering them to engage in combat only if they had to. All the groups executed their reconnoitring tasks without engaging in combat and all of them came back. **One group headed in the direction of Kragljivode with the task of engaging in combat and they destroyed a vehicle and killed three soldiers. A group was infiltrated into the area of Rupovo brdo, and it also engaged in combat, killing four Chetniks.** All of this happened after my return to Srebrenica, that is to say, in June 1995. I issued an order to all sabotage reconnaissance units from the Žepa area to go in the direction of Han Pogled, Han Pjesak and Sokolac at the Han Pjesak–Vlasenica road. By decision of the commander of the 285th Brigade, nine groups were formed to carry out these tasks.



These groups engaged in combat and killed some 60 Chetniks, while one group entered the village of Višnjica and torched several houses. On the return of these sabotage units from the Žepa area, efforts continued to be made in Srebrenica to heighten the level of combat of readiness, especially in the direction of Zeleni Jadar, where, having received information of the arrival of several busloads of Chetniks in Zeleni Jadar from Kragljivode, I asked the Chief of the Public Security Station, Hakija MEHOLJIĆ, to place the members of the Public Security Station at // disposal, so they too were engaged in the defence of the liberated territory. The Chetniks carried out an infantry attack on the Ljubisavića area and that attack was successfully repulsed although I don't know the date. The Commander of the 282nd Brigade, Ibro DUDIĆ, was constantly out on the terrain, and I received ongoing reports on the situation in the given areas. Sometime before noon he informed me that the situation was all right. He then informed me that the defence line had been broken through and requested assistance. This occurred about two to three days before our withdrawal. I sent him reinforcements from the sabotage reconnaissance company, about 15 men, to the area where the breakthrough had occurred. The same commander asked that I approve the withdrawal of troops from the right side of the flank, that is to say, from Visovo and around the Zeleni Jadar–Srebrenica route, with the explanation that they would be surrounded. I did not allow this and that segment of the defence line withdrew, without my approval, during the night. It is characteristic that in the course of the attack, the Chetniks came into the immediate vicinity of an UNPROFOR observation post with a tank and fired upon it. UNPROFOR thereupon withdrew its troops from the observation post, and as they were withdrawing, a member of the Dutch battalion was wounded and later died. Our side was accused of having killed that soldier. I spoke to the Brigade Commander about the circumstances, and he told me that Serbian soldiers had penetrated up to behind the line of the observation post. That day, the Chetniks advanced towards Srebrenica. The civilian population from the Slapovići camp settlement and other settlements withdrew in the direction of Srebrenica and Potočari. During the night, I consolidated our forces and decided to attack the Chetniks in the morning in the area of Bojna, above Pusolići, at their new lines. In the early morning we launched an attack, in the course of which the Chetniks were rebuffed on our left flank and had to draw back to their previous positions. On the right flank, the attack was halted because of crossfire from two tanks and a large number of wounded, as the right flank could not sustain the pace of the attack as well as the left. During the attack, scores of Chetniks were killed. I don't precisely know what losses we sustained, but I know they were not extensive. Around 600 troops – volunteers from all our units – participated in this attack. The Presidency of the Municipality promised to reward the troops with flour, and I know that a monetary award was promised for the destroyed tank. However, since I did not participate in adopting the decisions, I don't know what the extent of the promised rewards was.

Together with representatives of the civilian authorities, preparations were made to have the troops dig in on the new line, and for their rotation. However, in the course of the afternoon, the soldiers withdrew on their own initiative towards town so that the Chetniks while pulling out the bodies of their dead again reached the positions which they had held the previous day. I again tried, in the course of the night, that is to say, 10/11 July 1995, to consolidate forces in order to carry out a new counter-attack, with the intention of infiltrating troops into the rear and so firing on the front line and the rear simultaneously. Sometime around midnight, the UNPROFOR

commander requested a meeting with me and the representatives of the civilian authorities. Osman SULJIĆ, President of the Municipality, Adem SALIHOVIĆ, Chief of the Municipality, Suljo HASANOVIĆ, Secretary for National Defence and I were present at the meeting. I think that Hamdija FEJZIC was also there. On that occasion, the UNPROFOR commander informed us that the Chetniks had been give an ultimatum to which they had to respond by 0600 hours, according to which the Chetniks were required to withdraw to the positions they held before having taken the UNPROFOR observation post at Zeleni Jadar, and that if they were to refuse or refrain from commenting on the ultimatum, strong air strikes with around 100 aircraft participating would ensue. The zone from Zeleni Jadar to the new position of our units would be considered a dead zone, within which everything that moved would be fired upon. After this announcement and having consulted part of the Division Command which was present, and some of the brigade commanders, I decided to postpone the planned attack, so as not to find ourselves in a situation in which we would be exposed to an air attack. I changed my decision in the sense that the units would remain at the lines reached with a view to preventing the further advance of the aggressor, and that after the air strikes they would go in to mop up. Some time after 0600 hours, two British officers came to me in the Post Office building, and asked me to give them the targets for the air strikes since the Chetniks had failed to respond to the ultimatum. I sent Ekrem SALIHOVIĆ, Assistant for Intelligence Affairs, along with them. He is currently in the Division Command in Tuzla. They had the opportunity to see the targets, the tanks and other things in the /? exclusion zone/, but they could see them /as printed/. I was notified that the defence line at the Koštur trig point had been attacked, and that movement by Chetnks on the Zeleni Jadar – Slapovići route had been noticed. Very quickly, without my approval and having extended very weak resistance, the units withdrew to reserve positions in the Buće area. Along the Jadar and Srebrenica axis, the Chetniks began to torch houses in the hamlet of Pasmilić. Then a large group of Chetniks was noticed trying to enter the town itself, that is to say, the suburb of Učina bašća, but this attempt was thwarted. The hospital director constantly requested that I evacuate the hospital and the wounded, which I refused to do, believing that the town would not fall into the hands of the Chetniks. Some time around 1200 hours I was informed that an MSF representative had ensured the evacuation of the wounded to the UNPROFOR compound. Shortly afterwards, I was informed by Dr. Ilijaz PILAV, who is on liberated territory, that UNPROFOR would not be able to accept the wounded into the camp. He asked me to go with him and try to ensure that the wounded were taken in, and I did this. In view of the fact that the Chetniks had already penetrated Zaboljina, a surburb of Srebrenica, the previous night, the people broke into all warehouses in town, and carried off all the food supplies, moving in panic, towards Potočari. When I left for the UNPROFOR camp at the Vezionica in town, the camp commander informed me that he had taken the wounded into his camp, so he intended to transfer them to Potočari, and the people were already gathered in large numbers around the wire /? fence/ I noticed that UNPROFOR soldiers were directing the inhabitants to Potočarai. When I asked why, I was told that they, too, had the intention of moving on the Potočari. I saw that the people had broken into the camp. A shell hit the camp and I personally saw several wounded civilians, a woman, an elderly man and a child. Some time around 1400 hours, they notified me that NATO aircraft had started air strikes around Srebrenica and they kept me in the camp up to that point. As I left the camp, I saw everything within the came base, vehicles, carriers and so forth were full



of women and children. By the petrol station on the terrace, I saw my wife and I told her to go with the other women. I went towards the Post Office building where there was an amateur radio station with packet communications, which I had transferred to the Post Office building that morning. Representatives of the civilian authorities had been there earlier. I found no one in the building. In the vicinity of the Post Office, I encountered an armed soldier who told me that the representatives of the civilian authorities had gone off in the direction of the village of Kutić. At that point, the NATO air strikes commenced. As a result, I, too, decided to set off towards the village of Kutlić to consult the municipal officials as to what needed to be done. As I left the town, I saw Šemso SALIHOVIĆ, Chief of the Operations Section in the Division, and his /administrative/ assistant Midhat SALIHOVIĆ with a group of some twenty men and they told me that they had withdrawn from the line they held at Bojna. I ordered them to return and take the hill above the Post Office, in the suburbs and as far as they could, to delay the operations and advance of the infantry. I continued making my way to the village of Kutlić. Along the way I caught up with the President of the Municipality who told me he didn't know what more to do and informed me that the Chief of the Municipality was in the hamlet of Borković and that the packet communications and amateur radio station were there with him, along with the operators. That's where I met a courier of the 381st Brigade, who had already gone to see the Chief of the Municipality. The courier was carrying a report by Brigade Commander Zulfo TURSUMOVIĆ, informing me that the brigade was holding its lines successfully, that the 283rd Brigade had abandoned its position at Bučje and that he had taken it over, that NALIC, Commander of the Sabotage and Reconnaissance Platoon, aka Pupo, had been killed in fighting in the village of Bučje /as printed/ and that the Chetniks had been stopped. Since the Chief of the Municipality suggested to me, right after that report, that I go to the 281st Brigade, and knowing that the Commander of the 284th Brigade, the Chief of Public Security Station and the Division Chief of Security should be on its left flank, I decided to head for that position. I wrote on the same paper that I would be coming to the area, together with representatives of the Municipality, and that he ensure a source of /? power/ for me. I found the Chief of the Municipality, agreed on everything, and set out with the packet communications operators for the Commander of the 281st brigade. The Chief of the Municipality left several minutes before me, to meet with the President of the Municipality. After having covered some four kilometres, I met a soldier from that Brigade, who informed me that the people from Sućeska were being evacuated in the direction of Potočari, and that the Commander for the 281st Brigade with his troops would soon be withdrawing in the direction of Šušnjari. I contacted the Commander of the 281st Brigade by walkie-talkie and he confirmed the report. I returned to the village of Šušnjari and in the village of Babuljice obtained a source of /? power/. The village had been abandoned although it was deep within the territory. Then I arrived in the village of Šušnjari where I found a large number of soldiers and able-bodied civilians. Ibro DUDIĆ, the Commander of the 282nd Brigade, was there (we don't know what happened to him), who informed me that the Commanders of the 280th and 284th Brigades and the Chief of the Public Security Station were in the house of Sidik MUSTAFIĆ. I issued an order that he order the officers in his brigade to line the brigade up, establish its numerical strength, the number of weapons and the number of soldiers without weapons, while he should come with me to that house to make further arrangements. In the meantime, the Chief and President of the Municipality arrived at the house. Also present there was the Chief of Staff of the

283rd Brigade, a representative of the Mountain Battalion, known as Kezo, and the decision was taken to attempt a breakthrough to Tuzla. I ordered the signalmen to go out on a hill and establish communication with the Corps Command. We remained behind and determined the manner of movement, the sequence of units, security methods and reconnoitring and the rear of the column which would head towards Tuzla. The order was issued that the entire civilian population located there set off, but they were free to decide whether they would go with us or head towards UNPROFOR. After that agreement, I was informed that communications had been established with the 2nd Corps Command. I ordered the commanders to line up their units and form a column, and in the vicinity of the location where the packet communications was I encountered the Commander of the 281st Brigade, who had with him a good part of troops from the Brigade. All this transpired in the night between 11 and 12 July 1995. I was communicating with the Corps Chief of Staff, whom I informed about the situation in Srebrenica and the fact that it had to all purposes fallen, and that our intention was to head out for Tuzla. He warned me of the risk we were incurring, to which I responded that we had no choice. He asked me to inform him of the direction we would be moving in and I said that we would be heading toward Bajkovica. We conducted that conversation by packet communications. The number of people in the column which set out that evening was not established, but in my estimate there were between 10,000 and 15,000 people. I had around 6,000 troops, without counting the troops from Žepa. There were not many women in the column, and I did not see a lot of children. Maybe there were about ten women. We set off from Buljim towards Kamenica. Right at the beginning we had problems with the column, because panic broke out. When I came to the head of the column that had broken in two, I discovered that people had panicked because they thought they had seen something. I managed to calm them down and got the column back together. As a wounded person, I managed to get a horse and moved as part of the 280th Brigade, which was the second Brigade in the column, since the 284th Brigade was heading the column. They knew the terrain and for that reason they represented the reconnaissance party and provided security for the vanguard. The column was very long. Part of the column had already passed through the Chetnik lines. I heard only one or two shells being fired. Firing towards Buljim was infrequent. At around 1000 hours I ordered the column to stop for a rest, because I was very tired, and I had had to leave my horse behind earlier. I wanted to wait for the rear of the column to catch up in order to determine the actual state of affairs. When I arrived in the area where we were to rest, I received conflicting information, that is to say, there were those who were wounded or dead, while others had left the column and had gone ahead along the flank. All these reports caused panic among those present who were resting. After gathering the wounded, I think there were around 15 of them, at about 1600 hours I ordered the column to move out from that area. I placed the wounded just behind the 284th Brigade, while the Mountain Battalion was supposed to continue from the rear. The Commander of the 282nd Brigade, Ibri DUDIĆ, approached me at this point, having called over the Commander of the 281st Brigade, Zulfo TURSUNOVIĆ, and told me that I was preparing his murder. I saw that he had panicked. He demanded that his men, scouts, who were out reconnoitring the terrain, be returned to the 284th Brigade. I did not permit this. He told me that he had designated around ten young men of whom it was certain that some would cross over to liberated territory, and had given them the task to kill me if I crossed over. I saw that he had panicked and tried to calm him down,

but did not succeed. I started moving right behind the wounded, because I, too, could only move with difficulty due to my injury. We covered three or four kilometres, and then fire was opened on the moving column. People panicked. They fled forward, backwards, along the sides of the column. The firing lasted around ten minutes and was directed at that segment of the column in which I was located, but then the firing continued along the whole length of the column. There were no dead or wounded in the section of the column I was in, but I heard that there were wounded at the head of the column. I received a report from the Commander of the 282nd Brigade, who was still at the site from which we had set out, informing me that there were dead and wounded. He asked for medical staff and through Dr. PILAV I made sure that a medical technician went back to extend aid to the wounded. Night fell, and as the column had been broken off, no one knew how we were to proceed. I left the stream where we had gathered and found a section of the column on a meadow and we set out towards the head of the column. I stopped the column movement with my walkie-talkie. From that hill, I heard infantry fire from the area where we had been resting. I tried to establish communication with the commanders of the 282nd and 283rd brigades and battalions, but I did not succeed in getting through to anyone, and the Chetniks were jamming us. After ten minutes I was put through to the commander of a battalion who informed me that he was moving toward the objective. As I knew that he was last, I thought the column had been reconstituted. I received a request from the commander of the 284th Brigade to go to the head of the column. When I reached the head of the column, he informed me that the scouts in the area of Đugum were on a paved road and that the road could be crossed. I ordered that they cross the road through the culvert, below the paved road, and I ordered him to set off with the column. I set off in another part of column of his brigade. During this movement I reached the paved road and then I realised that they were not crossing the paved road as I had ordered, i.e. below, but I was brought up to the paved road to go across it. When we crossed the paved road, we crossed the Jadar River and set off toward Cerska and Udrč. Sometime after dawn, when we had left the ravine, I heard strong infantry fire from PAMs /anti-aircraft machine-guns/ behind our backs, and as I heard later, Chetnik personnel carriers came to the paved road, breaking off the column and opening fire at both sides of the column. A rest was planned in the Drč sector, so we stopped off there to receive the column. My assessment is that around half of the men that had set off to break through came there. The 282nd Brigade Commander and most of his troops did not arrive there. With the small groups various bits of information arrived about the situation at the rear of the column, that the Chetniks had surrounded them back at the rest area, that the Chetniks were entering the column and taking various groups to the side, that many people had been killed. However, when they started naming the persons who had been seen to be killed, I saw that these persons had been with us in the Drč sector, so I could not accept all this information as accurate. There was some information that some men went to negotiate with the Chetniks, but there was no way of verifying this information. In consultation with the commanders who were with me, it was decided that we return to the sector of the paved road and try to pull out a large group of our soldiers who were surrounded there. At around 1400 hours we received information that the Chetniks had withdrawn from the paved road and that a large group of our soldiers has crossed the paved road and were moving in the direction of Drč. After that I altered my decision, leaving the Mountain Battalion and IDč /Reconnaissance and Sabotage Company/ at Drč with twenty soldiers from the 284th Brigade who were familiar with the terrain, with the



task of collecting the arriving troops in the Drč sector and returning in the evening and trying to pull out the rest of the column. At around 1600 hours we set off from Drč in the direction of the village of Glode. We had no difficulties during our movement in that part of the journey. When the scouts went out to Glodansko Brdo, the 284th Brigade Commander called me up to the head of the column and told me that this hill was occupied by Chetniks. He proposed that we go around it, because the guides knew a way around it, which I accepted. After dawn we again had a rest. The battalion from the rear also arrived some time in the afternoon and the Commander informed me that they had tried to go out to the paved road to pull out the troops, but they had not found the part of the column that had remained there, so they had come back toward us. In the afternoon we set off in the direction of the village of Liplje, and assessing that we would have trouble with the Chetniks in the sector of Snagovo, I decided to make the Mountain Battalion part of the 284th Brigade. **After we passed the village of Liplje, we were ambushed. We fought back, crushed the ambush and captured a Chetnik officer whom we turned over to the 24th dKov /Army Division/ after the breakthrough.** We passed through a burned Muslim village, collected the wounded, waited for the rear of the column and set off in the direction of Snagovo, across the paved road. **We crossed the paved road without any particular problem, but when the rear came up, a Chetnik vehicle appeared from which they fired at our column, so security destroyed this vehicle.** We stopped the column for a rest in Križevačke Njive, and a group from the battalion went to reconnoitre. At around 1200 hours on 15 July 1995 I received information that the 284th Brigade Commander and Battalion Commander Ejub GOLIC had been wounded, and I was told that they doubted that GOLIC would survive. We made a line toward Baljkovica, and the main body of our part of the column also set off later. That evening we started fighting to break through toward the free territory. **We destroyed /word missing/ in the fighting, captured three tanks, we destroyed a tank in the morning when it was moving toward Baljkovica, we destroyed two trucks and a Praga, and captured a Praga.** After nightfall we stopped fighting and continued in the morning. Since we could use only one tank in the fighting, we set fire during our movement to the fuel tanks because there was no other way for us to destroy them. Simultaneously with our attack, **an attack was launched from the direction of the free territory, which was led by Commander Naser ORIC, but they could not break through the Chetnik defence line on that day.** That morning they, too, attacked the line from the direction of Nežuk and acting in coordination with our forces, we succeeded in linking up at around 1200 hours, when I met with Naser. Our forces crossed over that line over a period of several days, and in small groups, and the Chetniks established the earlier line just two days later.

I don't know of any elderly women killed while we were breaking through. I personally knew the old woman, Iva, who was also taken to be exchanged but she personally did not want to leave Srebrenica, but instead told her daughter-in-law who had come to pick her up: "When you fled Srebrenica you forgot me, and it's fine for me here."

During this crisis in Srebrenica, preceding the Chetnik attack, UNPROFOR requested that we negotiate with the Chetniks. I duly informed the Corps Command, the General Staff, the BH Presidency and the Government of the matter, but I received no instructions from anyone. As a result, I did not want to negotiate with the Chetniks.

Velid DELIĆ was also a participant in combat, although he was not a member of the BH Army. He asked that we put a 107 mm launcher at his disposal, and he successfully held back the advance of Chetnik tanks and their infantry from the direction of Zeleni Jadar towards Srebrenica. I heard that he managed to withdraw to the Žepa area, but I know nothing further of him.



I sent daily reports on events in Srebrenica and on the basis of the reports it is possible to precisely establish the actual state of affairs in the town. We were told that a humanitarian aid convoy would arrive in Srebrenica on the day NATO launched its air strikes, but the convoy never came.



Throughout these developments, the Chetniks on several occasions captured members of the Dutch battalion with their equipment and took them over to their side. The Chetniks fired on two of their carriers in the Bojna area without an adequate response by UNPROFOR. The Division Command was located in the area of the old town and the hunters' social centre, and on that final day, that is to say, 11 July 1995, it was impossible to approach the building since it was under constant Chetnik fire.

When a tank advanced to an area from which the centre was in plain sight, the personnel abandoned it but did not burn and destroy it, or the Division documentation either. The entire Division documentation probably fell into the hands of the Chetniks. We succeeded in destroying a large computer, which had been set up for data processing for packet communications, and which was located in the hospital, before we set off. We transported the computer used for packet communications to Drč, where I ordered the Communications Platoon Commander, Hamdija HASANOVIĆ, to destroy it. I later heard that instead of destroying it, HASANOVIĆ gave the computer to some soldier from the 284th Brigade to transfer it to liberated territory, so I don't know what the final outcome was. We did not succeed in finding it upon our arrival on liberated territory.



All the heavy weapons were in use throughout combat. A mountain gun remained at its position, but the firing pin had been removed. The assistant commander for intelligence fired from a *Crvena strijela* /Red Arrow/ hand-held rocket launcher and after being forced to withdraw, he threw the launcher with three missiles in a stream. The infantry weapons under UNPROFOR's charge were seized and used in combat.



All organs and parties on a higher level were kept abreast of these problems and so was the Corps. All reports were sent via the packet communications available in the Command, but we received no information or instructions on how to continue operating.

Huso SALIHOVIĆ, as Brigade Commander, joined the group which included Ibran MUSTAFIĆ and was replaced as a result. What I heard is that he set out in the direction of Tuzla, together with us, and then separated with some 300 to 400 soldiers and, as I heard, went to Žepa. Also active with him was Fahrudin ALIĆ, Assistant Commander of the Town Command, and he, too, took Ibran MUSTAFIĆ's side. Criminal charges were brought against him and Huso SALIHOVIĆ by the security organ of the Division because they attempted, through UNPROFOR, to send a letter to the the BH Presidency in which the Commander was /? Ljagan/ ORIĆ /as printed/. The members of the General Staff were informed about the content of this letter, and



as far as I know, the content of the letter was also cited in the annex to the criminal charges.

That is all I had to say about this event. The statement entirely corresponds to what I have said, which I confirm by hereby affixing my signature. The officials present while I gave the statement conducted themselves in a proper manner, and I have no complaint.

STATEMENT GIVEN BY:

Ramiz BEĆIROVIĆ /signed/

STATEMENT RECORDED BY:

/a signature/

/a signature/